Multi-Dimensional Pass-Through and Welfare Measures under Imperfect
  Competition by Adachi, Takanori & Fabinger, Michal
Multi-Dimensional Pass-Through and Welfare Measures
under Imperfect Competition∗
Takanori Adachi† Michal Fabinger‡
December 11, 2018
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of welfare measures when oligopolistic
firms face multiple policy interventions and external changes under general forms of market
demands, production costs, and imperfect competition. We present our results in terms of
two welfare measures, namely, marginal cost of public funds and incidence, in relation to
multi-dimensional pass-through. Our arguments are best understood with two-dimensional
taxation where homogeneous firms face unit and ad valorem taxes. The first part of the paper
studies this leading case. We show, e.g., that there exists a simple and empirically relevant
set of sufficient statistics for the marginal cost of public funds, namely unit tax and ad
valorem pass-through and industry demand elasticity. We then specialize our general setting
to the case of price or quantity competition and show how the marginal cost of public funds
and the pass-through are expressed using elasticities and curvatures of regular and inverse
demands. Based on the results of the leading case, the second part of the paper presents a
generalization with the tax revenue function specified as a general function parameterized
by a vector of multi-dimensional tax parameters. We then argue that our results are carried
over to the case of heterogeneous firms and other extensions.
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1 Introduction
In many economic situations, it is important to understand the impact of changes in government
policies, market conditions, or production technology. Both the impact on the economic equi-
librium and the associated change in the welfare of individual economic agents are of interest to
the policymaker. A convenient framework for studying these questions is laid out in Weyl and
Fabinger (2013) for the case of constant changes in marginal cost such as a unit tax. In this paper,
we provide a substantial generalization of this framework under general forms of market demands,
production costs, and imperfect competition. We allow not only for changes in costs proportional
to the value of the goods such as an ad-valorem tax but also for much more general interventions
such as different kinds of market regulation. In addition, we provide a new perspective on the
case of heterogeneous firms.
The range of possibilities for governments’ intervention is much richer than just specific and ad-
valorem taxes, on which the existing literature has focused (see Section 2), especially if we consider
regulations of various kinds. Governments often intervene in the marketplace by restricting sales.
Examples include restrictions of sales on Sundays and holidays in many European countries, or
restrictions of sales of alcohol, both in terms of time of sales and in terms of locations where sales
are allowed. Governments also often regulate the labor market. Examples include restrictions on
the number of working hours or stipulation of a minimum wage. Besides these, governments also
impose reporting requirements that influence the degree to which non-compliant firms misreport
their marketplace data to minimize their tax bill.
Given that there are many possible interventions, it is convenient to summarize the interven-
tions of interest in a (multi-dimensional) vector. The impact of infinitesimal changes in these
interventions on prices then corresponds to a vector (or more generally a matrix), which may be
termed multi-dimensional pass-through. The relative size of its components then provides insight
into the relationship between the impact of individual interventions, for example, the impact of
specific vs. ad-valorem taxes. We show that the multi-dimensional pass-through is an important
determinant of the welfare effects of various kinds of interventions.1
1The usefulness of pass-through in welfare analysis has been verified by related studies such as Cowan (2012);
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Our arguments are best understood with two-dimensional taxation where homogeneous firms
face unit and ad valorem taxes. Therefore, in the first part of the paper (Sections 2 and 3), we
derive succinct formulas that relate the marginal cost of public funds to pass-through of these
taxes. We also establish a relationship that connects pass-through of unit taxes and pass-through
of ad-valorem taxes in the same market. Furthermore, we derive convenient expressions for values
of unit and ad valorem pass-through that are valid under a “general” type competition and have
not appeared in the previous literature. In addition, we show how the marginal cost of public
funds and pass-through are expressed in terms of elasticities and curvatures of demand and inverse
demand when the setting is specialized to price (differentiated Bertrand) or quantity (pure or
differentiated Cournot) competition. We also provide numerical examples. Our results also apply
without a change to symmetric oligopoly with multi-product firms. Throughout the analysis, we
allow for non-zero levels of unit and ad valorem taxes. However, we also discuss some additional
simplifications that appear when instead the initial level of taxes is zero.
Inspired by the results of this setting of two-dimensional taxation, the second part of the paper
generalizes our model in two directions (Sections 4, 5, and 6). First, we allow for interventions that
are more general than just specific and ad valorem taxes. Second, we introduce firm heterogeneity.
We find that these more general relationships have a form that still relatively simple and succinct.
This substantially expands the applicability of our results.
From both theoretical and empirical standpoints, it is desirable to be able to understand the
welfare properties of oligopolistic markets with a fairly general type of competition. In real-world
situations, firms’ behavior may not simply be categorized into either the idealized price competition
or the idealized quantity competition. Price competition does not allow for any friction in scaling
production levels up or down, yet in reality there tend to be substantial frictions, such as those
related to financial constraints or the labor market. Quantity competition implies that the firm
Miller, Remer, and Sheu (2013); Weyl and Fabinger (2013); Gaudin and White (2014); MacKay, Miller, Remer, and
Sheu (2014); Adachi and Ebina (2014a,b); Chen and Schwartz (2015); Gaudin (2016); Cowan (2016); Alexandrov
and Bedre-Defolie (2017); Mra´zova´ and Neary (2017); and Chen, Li and Schwartz (2018). See also Ritz (2018)
for an excellent survey of theoretical studies on pass-through and pricing under imperfect competition. In the
context of antitrust analysis, Froeb, Tschantz, and Werden (2005) theoretically compare the price effects when no
synergies in cost reduction realize when they are passed through as a form of price reduction. See also Alexandrov
and Koulayev (2015) for discussions on the role of pass-through in antitrust analysis.
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will not be able to increase production levels when its competitor suddenly decides to increase
prices. In reality, such adjustment is probably feasible, since capacity utilization is typically less
than complete, and even if the firm is operating at full capacity, boosting production levels is
possible by overtime work or by hiring temporary workers. Moreover, firms may behave, to some
extent, in a collusive way. Although the realities of competition by firms may be complicated, it
is possible to capture their essence by working with a “general” type of competition, using the
conduct index.2
Besides working with a more general type of competition, it is also useful to relax the assump-
tion of constant marginal costs that often appears in the literature. Production technologies often
have a non-trivial structure, and so does the internal organization of the firm. For example, if
a firm decides to operate at a larger scale, it may take advantage of technological and logistical
economies of scale, but at the same time, it may face more severe principal-agent problems as top
managers have to delegate responsibilities to lower-level managers. The interplay between these
forces can lead to a non-trivial dependence of the marginal cost of production on the scale of the
operation. A notable benefit from our general framework is that one does not necessarily have to
assume constant marginal cost in conducting welfare assessment in a precise manner.
In this spirit, the aim of Weyl and Fabinger’s (2013) study is to analyze imperfect competition
in a way that does not rely on limiting functional form assumptions. It is followed by Fabinger
and Weyl (2018), who propose using further flexible functional forms to make economic models
or their parts solvable in closed form. The present paper goes in a different direction: we focus
on more general market interventions and exogenous market changes without requiring that the
models or their parts be solved in closed form. As mentioned above, ad valorem taxes are not
studied in Weyl and Fabinger (2013). In this paper, we provide a more general framework that
allows not only for ad valorem taxes but for other interventions in a general manner.
2Our conduct index is a generalization of what is known as “conduct parameter” in the empirical industrial
organization literature, where it is supposed to be constant for any level of industry output as a target of estimation
(see, e.g., Bresnahan 1989; Genesove and Mullin 1998; Nevo 1998; Corts 1999; Delipalla and O’Donnell 2001; and
Shcherbakov and Wakamori 2017). It has also been successfully applied to more general situations, such as selection
markets (Mahoney and Weyl 2017) or supply chains (Gaudin 2018). In this paper, we generalize this concept by
allowing it to vary across different levels of output: we thus opt for the term “conduct index” to make it explicit
that it is a variable. In a less general setting, such “conduct index” was used by Weyl and Fabinger (2013), where
it was still referred to as “conduct parameter”.
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The rest of the paper mainly consists of two parts: the first part focuses on the canonical
situation of two-dimensional taxation where symmetric firms face unit and ad valorem taxes,
and the second part extends these results to a more general framework of multiple government
interventions and external changes, allowing firm heterogeneity. First, in the next section, we
set up a framework of two-dimensional taxation under imperfect competition and provide general
formulas for marginal cost of public funds and incidence in relation to unit tax and ad valorem
tax pass-throughs and industry demand elasticity. In Section 3, we specialize this setting to the
case of price or quantity competition. Then, in the second part of the paper, Section 4 generalizes
the results from unit and ad valorem taxation to much more flexible taxation parameterized by d
different tax parameters and discusses the implications of these general results. We also discuss
other types of government/exogenous interventions that are suitable for our framework. Then, in
Section 5 we generalize our formulas to include heterogeneous firms. Finally, Section 6 generalizes
our previous results to include changes in both production costs and taxes. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Taxation and Welfare in Symmetric Oligopoly
We begin with a canonical setting where firms face two types of taxation: unit and ad valorem
taxes. This issue has been in the central part of the existing literature on government interventions.
The welfare cost of taxation has been extensively studied at least since Pigou (1928). The majority
of the studies simply assume perfect competition (with zero initial taxes).3 As is widely known,
under perfect competition, unit tax and ad valorem tax are equivalent, and whether consumers or
producers bear more is determined by the relative elasticities of demand and supply (Weyl and
Fabinger, 2013, p. 534). The initial attempt to relax the assumption of perfect competition started
with an analysis of homogeneous-product oligopoly under quantity competition, i.e., Cournot
oligopoly. Notably, Delipalla and Keen (1992), Skeath and Trandel (1994), and Hamilton (1999)
3See, e.g., Vickrey (1963), Buchanan and Tullock (1965), Johnson and Pauly (1969), and Browing (1976) for
early studies. A study of unit and ad valorem taxation under imperfect competition with homogeneous products
dates back to Delipalla and Keen (1992). See Auerbach and Hines (2002) and Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) for
comprehensive surveys for this field.
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compare ad valorem and unit taxes in such a setting. Then, Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider
(2001a) extend these results to the case of differentiated oligopoly under price competition. In
particular, Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001a) find that whether the after-tax price for
firms and their profits rise by a change in ad valorem tax depends importantly on the ratio of the
curvature of the firm’s own demand to the elasticity of the market demand.4
In this section, we extend Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider’s (2001a) setting and results in a
number of important directions. First, we consider a “general” mode of competition, captured by
the conduct index, including both quantity and price competition. Second, we provide a complete
characterization of tax burdens that enables one to quantitatively compare consumers’ burden with
producers’ burden, whereas Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider’s (2001a) focus only on the effective
prices for consumers and producers’ profits. Third, while Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider’s
(2001a) assume constant marginal cost, we allow non-constant marginal cost and show how this
generalization makes a difference in our general formulas. Fourth, we further generalize the initial
tax level. When they analyze the effects of a unit tax, Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001a)
assume that ad valorem tax is zero, and vice versa. In contrast, we allow non-zero initial taxes in
both dimensions. Finally, and importantly, we generalize these results to the case of a very general
type of taxation, as well as to production cost changes. This opens up the possibility to study a
wider range of interventions/taxes and to derive convenient sufficient statistics for characteristics,
including welfare characteristics, of the markets of interest.5
4This curvature is denoted εm in their notation, whereas we instead use αF below, and this elasticity is denoted
εDD in their notation, whereas we instead use  below.
5Our framework is in line with the “sufficient-statistics” approach to connecting structural and reduced-form
methods, as advocated by Chetty (2009), which has been successful in empirical economics. For example, in the
study by Atkin and Donaldson (2016), the pass-through rate provides a sufficient statistic for welfare implications
of intra-national trade costs in low-income countries, without the need for a full demand estimation. Similarly,
Ganapati, Shapiro, and Walker (2018) examine the welfare effects of input taxation, where a unit tax is levied on the
input. These effects are related to the effects of unit taxes on output, but not identical. See also Fabra and Reguant
(2014); Shrestha and Markowitz (2016); Stolper (2016); Hong and Li (2017); Duso and Szu¨cs (2017); Gulati,
McAusland, and Sallee (2017); and Muehlegger and Sweeney (2017) for studies with the same spirit. In contrast,
Kim and Cotterill (2008) is among the first studies that structurally estimate cost pass-through in differentiated
product markets, followed by Bonnet, Dubois, Villas-Boas, and Klapper (2013); Bonnet and Re´quillart (2013);
Campos-Va´zquez and Medina-Cortina (2015); Miller, Remer, Ryan, and Sheu (2016); Conlon and Rao (2016);
Miller, Osborne, and Sheu (2017); and Griffith, Nesheim, and O’Connell (2018).
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2.1 Setup
Below, we study oligopolistic markets with n symmetric firms and a general (first-order) mode
of competition and the resulting symmetric equilibria.6 Our discussion applies to single-product
firms as well as to multi-product firms if intra-firm symmetry conditions are satisfied, as discussed
in Appendix A.1.12. For simplicity of exposition, we use terminology corresponding to single-
product firms here, and later we discuss how to interpret the results in the case of multi-product
firms.
Formally, the demand for firm j’s product qj = qj(p1, ..., pn) ≡ qj (p) depends on the vector of
prices p ≡ (p1, ..., pn) charged by the individual firms. The demand system is symmetric and the
cost function c(qj) is the same for all firms. We assume that qj(·) and c(·) are twice differentiable
and conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium and the associated second-order conditions are
satisfied. We denote by q(p) the per-firm industry demand corresponding to symmetric prices:
q(p) ≡ qj(p, ..., p). The elasticity of this function, defined as (p) ≡ −pq′(p)/q(p) > 0 and referred
to as the price elasticity of industry demand, should not be confused with the elasticity of the
residual demand that any of the firms faces.7 We also use the notation η(q) = 1/ (p) |q(p)=q for
the reciprocal of this elasticity as a function of q. For the corresponding functional values, when
we do not need to specify explicitly their dependence on either q or p, we use η interchangeably
with 1/.
As mentioned above, we introduce two types8 of taxation: a unit tax t and an ad valorem tax v,
with firm j’s profit being pij = (1−v)pj(qj)qj−tqj−c(qj). At symmetric quantities the government
tax revenue per firm is R (q) ≡ tq + vp (q) q, and we denote by τ (q) the fraction of firm’s pre-tax
6Although for brevity we speak of a general mode of competition, we consider only “first-order” competition, in
the sense of the firms making decisions based on marginal cost and marginal revenue. This excludes, for example,
the possibility of vertical industries, an important issue left for future research.
7The elasticity  here corresponds to D in Weyl and Fabinger (2013, p. 542). Note that q
′(p) = ∂qj(p)/∂pj +
(n − 1)∂qj(p)/∂pj′ |p=(p,...,p) for any two distinct indices j and j′. We will define the firm’s elasticity and other
related concepts in Section 3.
8This specification corresponds to a two-dimensional (tax) instrument (t, v), which is a special case of multi-
dimensional instruments. For example, if the cost function had an additional technology parameter z, we could
describe the situation using a three-dimensional instrument (t, v, z) . In Section 4, we introduce a framework for
multi-dimensional pass-through. For now, we specialize to the two-dimensional case of specific and ad valorem
taxes, which are very common: for example, in the United States both types of taxes are imposed on the sales of
soda, alcohol and cigarettes.
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revenue that is collected by the government in the form of taxes: τ (q) ≡ R (q) /pq = v + t/p (q).
We now introduce the conduct index θ(q), which measures the industry’s competitiveness (a lower θ
corresponds to a fiercer level of competition). Here, it is determined independently of the cost side
but potentially can change for different values of the industry’s output, q. Then, the symmetric
equilibrium condition is written as
1
η (q) p (q)
(
p (q)− t+mc (q)
1− v
)
= θ(q), (1)
where mc(q) ≡ c′(q) is the marginal cost of production.9 We denote by θ the functional value of
θ(q) at the equilibrium quantity. This is also understood as the elasticity-adjusted Lerner index :
the markup rate [p−(t+mc)/(1−v)]/p should be adjusted by the industry-wide elasticity to reflect
the competitiveness in the industry, where (t+mc)/(1−v) is interpreted as the effective marginal
cost.10 We emphasize here that once the conduct index is introduced, one is able to describe
oligopoly in a synthetic manner, without specifying whether it is price or quantity setting, or
whether it exhibits strategic substitutability or complementarity.
2.2 The marginal cost of public funds and pass-through
The marginal cost of public funds, i.e., the marginal social welfare loss associated with raising
additional tax revenue, is a crucial characteristic that a policymaker needs to take into account
when designing an optimal system of taxes.11 In the special case of linear demand and constant
marginal cost, Ha¨ckner and Herzing (2016, p. 147) explain that as long as the initial level of
9As already noted in Footnote 2 above, θ(q) is a generalization of conduct parameter in the sense that it is
a function of q rather than a constant for any q. Hence, Equation (1) should not be interpreted as an equation
that defines θ(q). For our analysis we introduce θ(q) in an implicit manner: θ(q) is a function independent of
the cost side of the problem such that Equation (1) is the symmetric first-order condition of the equilibrium. For
specific types of ("first-order") competition, such as those discussed in Section 3, it is possible to derive explicit
expressions for θ(q) that can replace our implicit definition. Presumably, it is natural to assume θ′(·) < 0: a smaller
amount of production is associated with a smaller degree of competitiveness in the industry due to other reasons
than non-cooperative and simultaneous pricing (modeled here), such as (unmodeled) tacit collusion. However, this
restriction is not necessary for the following analysis. Also, note that θ(q) > 1 is not necessarily excluded, although
in most interesting cases it lies in [0, 1].
10Accordingly, one can write the modified Lerner rule under (v, t) as (p − t+mc1−v )/p = ηθ, which implies the
restriction on θ: θ ≤ .
11In the absence of other considerations, the marginal cost of public funds should be equalized across markets in
order to maximize social welfare.
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taxes is zero, the marginal cost of public funds for unit taxation equals MCt = θρt, where ρt is
the unit-tax pass-through rate (the marginal effect of unit taxes on prices), and θ is the conduct
index. For ad valorem taxes, Ha¨ckner and Herzing (2016) provide a similar formula. They argue,
however, that if we let the initial level of taxes be non-zero, those formulas are no longer valid.
For this reason, they are forced to analyze the magnitude of the marginal cost of public funds on
a case-by-case basis using explicit solutions to specific models.
This situation represents a puzzle. If there are simple formulas for the marginal cost of public
funds that were valid at zero taxes, is there no compact generalization of these expressions in the
case of non-zero taxes? If there is no such generalization, that would be an obstacle to empirical
work, since we would have to make additional modeling assumptions before obtaining empirical
estimates of the marginal cost of public funds. Our paper provides a solution to this problem. In
particular, Proposition 1 below presents formulas for the marginal cost of public funds that are
valid even when the initial level of (both ad valorem and unit) taxes is non-zero. They are a bit
longer than MCt = θρt, but still very manageable. They also represent a starting point for the
topics discussed in the rest of the paper. These results with a non-zero initial taxes being allowed,
which are differentiated from Weyl and Fabinger (2013) and Ha¨ckner and Herzing (2016), should
be useful if one needs to evaluate the marginal cost of taxation when some tax has been already
implemented.
The marginal welfare cost MCt or MCv of raising government revenue by the unit tax t or the
ad valorem tax v, i.e. the marginal cost of public funds associated with such a tax, is defined as
MCt ≡ −
(
∂R
∂t
)−1
∂W
∂t
, MCv ≡ −
(
∂R
∂v
)−1
∂W
∂v
,
where W is the social welfare per firm, which includes consumer surplus, producer surplus, and
government tax revenue. We define the unit tax pass-through rate ρt and the ad valorem tax
8
pass-through semi-elasticity ρv as:
12
ρt =
∂p
∂t
, ρv =
1
p
∂p
∂v
.
Consider an infinitesimal change in the unit tax, with the initial tax level (t, v). As mentioned
in the introduction, in the special case of zero initial taxes, linear demand, and constant marginal
cost, Ha¨ckner and Herzing (2016, p. 147) show that MCt = θρt and MCv = θρv, noting that at
non-zero initial taxes the formula no longer applies. In the absence of such formula, they were
forced to study the marginal cost of public funds on a case-by-case basis, for different specifications
of demand and cost.
Intuitively, there are at least two reasons why θρt fails to be an accurate measure of the marginal
cost of public funds when a unit tax is raised.13 First, the expression is simply proportional to θ,
but when v is large, the firms sell at prices that are too high from the social perspective not mainly
because of a lack of competitiveness, but primarily because the tax effectively raises their perceived
cost. When v is large, we would expect the marginal cost of public funds to be less sensitive to
θ, for a given value of ρt. Second, the expression θρt does not explicitly feature the level of the
unit tax t. However, a situation where t is large and mc small is very different from a situation
where t is small and mc large, even if the equilibrium prices and quantities are the same. In the
former case, raising additional tax revenue is quite harmful, since firms’ production cuts will not
substantially decrease the total technological (i.e., pre-tax) cost of production. In the latter case,
raising additional tax revenue is less harmful since it leads to reduced total technological cost.
Based on this intuition, we would expect the marginal cost of public funds to be an increasing
function of t.14
Thus, we are led to find a generalization of the formula MCt = θρt and MCv = θρv that would
be applicable even at non-zero initial taxes. It turns out that it is possible to identify a formula
12Note that Ha¨ckner and Herzing (2016) use the symbol ρv for the ad valorem tax pass-through rate ∂p/∂v,
which corresponds to pρv in our notation.
13An analogous argument applies for θρv and the marginal cost of public funds of tax v.
14In the sense of making the change t → t + ∆t, and simultaneously c (q) → c (q) − q∆t in order to keep q, θ,
and ρt at some fixed values.
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with precisely these properties, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 1. Marginal cost and total of public funds for unit and ad valorem
taxations. Under symmetric oligopoly with a possibly non-constant marginal cost, the marginal
cost of public funds associated with a unit tax may be expressed as
MCt =
(1− v) θ +  τ
1
ρt
+ v −  τ ,
and the marginal cost of public funds associated with an ad valorem tax may be expressed as
MCv =
(1− v) θ + τ
1
ρv
+ v − τ .
The proposition is proven in Appendix A.1.1 and the intuition behind it is discussed in detail
in Appendix A.1.2. Here in the main text we just include Figure I, which documents that these
expressions for the marginal cost of public funds MCt and MCv evaluated at realistic values of
taxes and other economic variables are very different from the values of the expressions θρt and
θρv (discussed above) that would be equal to MCt and MCv if taxes were zero.
2.3 Incidence and pass-through
We define the incidence It of unit taxation as the ratio of changes dCS in (per-firm) consumer
surplus and changes dPS in (per-firm) producer surplus induced by an infinitesimal increase dt
in the unit tax t. The incidence Iv of ad valorem taxation is defined analogously. We obtain the
following succinct results for the incidence of taxation at non-zero unit and ad valorem taxes.
Proposition 2. Incidence of taxation. Under symmetric oligopoly with a general type of
competition and with a possibly non-constant marginal cost, the incidence of unit taxes It and of
ad valorem taxes Iv is given by
1
It
=
1
ρt
− (1− v) (1− θ) , 1
Iv
=
1
ρv
− (1− v) (1− θ) .
10
Figure I: The ratio of the actual marginal cost of public funds MC and the naive expression θρ
discussed just before Proposition 1, plotted as a function of combinations of the conduct index θ,
the pass-through ρ, and the industry demand elasticity . The figures on the left correspond to
infinitesimal changes in unit taxation: ρ stands for ρt and MC stands for MCt. The numerical
values were chosen to be t = 0, v = 0.2, τ = 0.2. The figures on the right correspond to
infinitesimal changes in ad valorem taxation: ρ stands for ρv and MC stands for MCv. The
numerical values were chosen to be t/p = 0.2, v = 0, τ = 0.2. The top figures correspond to
θ = 0.3, the middle figures correspond to  = 2, and the bottom figures correspond to ρ = 1.
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The proposition is proven in Appendix A.1.3, and we discuss it in detail in Appendix A.1.4.
Note that in the case of zero ad valorem tax, the expression for It reduces to Weyl and Fabinger’s
(2013, p. 548) Principle of Incidence 3. Next we show how ρt and ρv are related in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. Relationship between pass-through of ad valorem and unit taxes.
Under symmetric oligopoly with a possibly non-constant marginal cost, the pass-through semi-
elasticity ρv of an ad valorem tax may be expressed in terms of the unit tax pass-through rate ρt,
the conduct index θ, and the industry demand elasticity  as
ρv =
(
1− θ

)
ρt. (2)
The proposition is proven Appendix A.1.5, and Appendix A.1.6 provides a detailed discussion.
Combined with Proposition 1, it is consistent with the well-known result that unit tax and ad
valorem tax are equivalent in the welfare effects under perfect competition: if θ = 0, then ρt = ρv.
Under imperfect competition, ρt > ρv, and MCt > MCv. This provides another look of Anderson,
de Palma, and Kreider’s (2001b) result that unit taxes are welfare-inferior to ad valorem taxes.15
By combining Propositions 1 and 3, we find that MCt and MCv can be expressed without the
degree of competitiveness θ.
Proposition 4. Sufficient statistics for marginal costs of public funds. Under sym-
metric oligopoly with a possibly non-constant marginal cost, the unit pass-through rate ρt, the ad
valorem pass-through semi-elasticity ρv, and the elasticity  of industry demand (together with the
tax rates and the fraction τ of the firm’s pre-tax revenue collected by the government in the form
of taxes) serve as sufficient statistics for the marginal cost of public funds both with respect to unit
taxes and ad valorem taxes. In particular:
MCt =
(1− v + τ)ρt − (1− v)ρv
1 + (v − τ)ρt
, MCv =
(1− v + τ) ρt − (1− v)ρv
1 + (v − τ) ρv
ρv
ρt
.
15Under Cournot competition, Equation (6.13) of Auerbach and Hines (2002) coincides with Equation (2) above.
Proposition 3 shows that this equation holds more generally. We thank Germain Gaudin for pointing this out.
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The proof is simple: Proposition 3 allows us to express the conduct index θ as θ = (1−ρv/ρt).
Substituting this into the relationships in Proposition 1 then gives the desired result. For a detailed
discussion of related intuition, see Appendix A.1.7.
As the last result presented in this section, the following proposition shows how the two forms
of pass-through are characterized.
Proposition 5. Pass-through under symmetric oligopoly. Under symmetric oligopoly with
a general (first-order) mode of competition and with a possibly non-constant marginal cost:
ρt =
1
1− v
1[
1 + 1−τ
1−v χ
]− (η + χ) θ + q (θη)′ ,
where the derivative is taken with respect to q and χ ≡ mc′q/mc is the elasticity of the marginal
cost with respect to quantity. Further,
ρv =
− θ
(1− v) 
1[
1 + 1−τ
1−v χ
]− (η + χ) θ + q (θη)′ .
The proof and a related discussion are in Appendix A.1.8. Further, we discuss a relationship
with Weyl and Fabinger (2013) in Appendix A.1.9, provide a comparison of perfect and oligopolis-
tic competition in Appendix A.1.10, and show the applicability of these results to exchange rate
changes in Appendix A.1.11.
2.4 Global changes in surplus measures
So far, we have discussed local, i.e. infinitesimal, changes in surplus measures (CS, PS, R, W ).
For larger changes in some tax T , it is desirable to have an understanding of global changes in
surplus measures. Consider surplus measures A and B. Their finite changes ∆A =
∫ T2
T1
dA(T )
dT
dT
and ∆B =
∫ T2
T1
dB(T )
dT
dT induced by a tax change from T = T1 to T = T2 are related to their
incidence ratios ΘAB ≡ dA(T )dT /dB(T )dT . In particular, ∆A/∆B is a weighted average of ΘAB over the
interval (T1, T2):
∆A
∆B
=
∫
T∈(T1,T2)
ΘAB dw
(T1,T2)
B (T ) ,
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where dw
(T1,T2)
B (T ) ≡ dB(T )dT dT/
∫ T2
T1
dB(T ′)
dT ′ dT
′ is a weight normalized to one on the corresponding
interval:
∫ T2
T1
dw
(T1,T2)
B (T ) = 1. The weight is positive as long as
dB(T )
dT
has the same sign as∫ T2
T1
dB(T )
dT
dT , which is typically satisfied in useful applications. In many useful cases A and B are
zero at infinite T . Then
A (T1)
B (T1)
=
∫
T∈(T1,∞)
ΘAB dw
(T1,∞)
B (T ) .
For example,
CS (T1)
PS (T1)
=
∫
T∈(T1,∞)
IT dw
(T1,∞)
PS (T ) ,
W (T1)
R (T1)
=
∫
T∈(T1,∞)
MCT dw
(T1,∞)
R (T ) .
In the case of a per-unit tax, we obtain16
CS (t1)
PS (t1)
=
∫∞
t1
IT q dt∫∞
t1
q dt
.
3 Taxation and Welfare under Specific Types of Compe-
tition
In this section, we show that for price competition and quantity competition in differentiated
oligopoly, our general expressions of the marginal cost of public funds and pass-through lead
to expressions in terms of demand primitives such as the elasticities and the curvatures, and the
marginal cost elasticity χ defined above.17 Throughout this section, we assume that firms’ conduct
is simply described by one-shot Nash behavior, without any other further possibilities such as tacit
collusion. As seen below, this assumption enables one to express the conduct index in terms of
demand and inverse demand elasticities, using Equation (1) directly (see Subsection 3.2). We also
16Note that in this case dw
(t,∞)
PS = q dt/PS = q dt/
∫∞
t1
q dt
17The question of whether quantity- or price-setting firms are more appropriate depends on the nature of compe-
tition. As Riordan (2008, p. 176) argues, quantity competition is a more appropriate model if one depicts a situation
where firms determine the necessary capacity for production. However, price-setting firms are more suitable if firms
in the industry of focus can quickly adjust to demand by changing their prices. Although the real-world case of
competition is not as clear-cut as this, as we have emphasized in Introduction, we argue below that it is possible
to provide another useful characterization for the marginal costs of public funds and the pass-through rates by
specifying the mode of competition.
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provide parametric examples for these results.
3.1 Elasticities and curvatures of the demand system
Direct demand. Following Holmes (1989, p. 245), we define the own price elasticity F (p) and
the cross price elasticity C(p) of the firm’s direct demand by
F (p) ≡ − p
q (p)
∂qj(p)
∂pj
|p=(p,...,p), C(p) ≡ (n− 1)p
q (p)
∂qj′(p)
∂pj
|p=(p,...,p),
where j and j′ is an arbitrary pair of distinct indices. These are related to the industry demand
elasticity (p) by F =  + C .
18 Next, we define the curvature of the industry’s direct demand
α(p), the own curvature αF (p) of the firm’s direct demand and the cross curvature αC(p) of the
firm’s direct demand :19
α(p)≡−pq
′′(p)
q′(p)
, αF (p)≡−p
(
∂qj(p)
∂pj
)−1
∂2qj(p)
∂p2j
, αC(p)≡−(n−1)p
(
∂qj(p)
∂pj
)−1
∂2qj(p)
∂pj∂pj′
,
where again the derivatives are evaluated at p = (p, ..., p), and j and j′ is an arbitrary pair of
distinct indices. These curvatures satisfy α = (αF + αC)F/ and are related to the elasticity of
F (p) by p 
′
F (p)/F (p) = 1 +  (p)− αF (p)− αC (p) (see Appendix A.2.1 for the derivation and a
related discussion).
Inverse demand. We introduce analogous definitions for inverse demand. We define the own
quantity elasticity ηF (q) and the cross quantity elasticity ηC(q) of the firm’s inverse demand as
ηF (q) ≡ −
q
p(q)
∂pj(q)
∂qj
|q=(q,...,q), ηC(q) ≡ (n− 1)
q
p(q)
∂pj′(q)
∂qj
|q=(q,...,q),
18Holmes (1989) shows this for two symmetric firms, but it is straightforward to verify this relation more generally.
See the equation in Footnote 7 above. Note that the equation F =  + C simply means that the percentage of
consumers who cease to purchase firm j’s product in response to its price increase is decomposed into (i) those who
no longer purchase from any of the firms () and (ii) those who switch to (any of) the other firms’ products (C).
Thus, F measures the firm’s own competitiveness: it is decomposed into the industry elasticity and the degree
of rivalry. In this sense, these three price elasticities characterize “first-order competitiveness,” which determines
whether the equilibrium price is high or low, but one of them is not independently determined from the other two
elasticities.
19The curvature αF (p) here corresponds to α(p) of Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010, p. 1603).
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for arbitrary distinct j and j′. These satisfy ηF = η + ηC .
20 We define the curvature of the
industry’s inverse demand σ(q), the own curvature σF (q) of the firm’s inverse demand and the
cross curvature σC(q) of the firm’s inverse demand by:
σ(q)≡−qp
′′(q)
p′(q)
, σF (q)≡−q
(
∂pj(q)
∂qj
)−1
∂2pj(q)
∂q2j
, σC(q)≡−(n−1)q
(
∂pj(q)
∂qj
)−1
∂2pj(q)
∂qj∂qj′
,
where again the derivatives are evaluated at q = (q, ..., q) and the indices j and j′ are distinct.
These curvatures represent an oligopoly counterpart of monopoly σ(q) of Aguirre, Cowan, and
Vickers (2010, p. 1603). They satisfy the relationship σ = (σF + σC)(ηF/η) and are related to
the elasticity of ηF (q) by q η
′
F (q)/ηF (q) = 1 + η (q)− σF (q)− σC (q) (see Appendix A.2.2 for the
derivation and a related discussion).
3.2 Expressions for conduct index and pass-through
In the case of price competition, the conduct index θ is θ = /F = 1/(ηF ), which is verified by
comparing the firm’s first-order condition with Equation (1). The marginal cost of public funds
and the incidence are obtained by substituting these expressions into those of Propositions 1 and
2.
Proposition 6. Pass-through under price competition. Under symmetric oligopoly with
price competition and with a possibly non-constant marginal cost:
ρt =
1
1− v
1
1 + (1−α/F )
F
+
(
1−τ
1−v − 1F
)
χ
,
ρv =
1
1− v
1
1
1−1/F +
(1−α/F )
F−1 +
(
1−τ
1−v
F
F−1 − 1F−1
)
 χ
.
20The identity ηF = η + ηC means that as a response to firm j’s increase in its output, the industry as a
whole reacts by lowering firm j’s price (η). However, each individual firm (other than j) reacts to this firm j’s
output increase by reducing its own output. This counteracts the initial change in the price (ηC < 0), and thus
a percentage reduction in the price for firm j (ηF ) is smaller than η, which does not take into account strategic
reactions. Note here that 1/ηF , not ηF , measures the industry’s competitiveness. Thus, these three quantity
elasticities characterize “first-order competitiveness,” which determines whether the equilibrium quantity is high
or low.
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The proof is in Appendix A.2.3 and a detailed discussed in Appendix A.2.4.
Next, in the case of quantity competition, the conduct index θ is given by θ = ηF/η, which
is, again, verified by comparing the firm’s first-order condition with Equation (1). Again, the
marginal cost of public funds and the incidence are obtained by substituting these expressions
into those of Propositions 1 and 2. For the proof and a related discussion, see Appendix A.2.5
and A.2.6.
Proposition 7. Pass-through under quantity competition. Under symmetric oligopoly with
quantity competition and with a possibly non-constant marginal cost:
ρt=
1
1− v
1
1 + ηF
η
− σ +(1−τ
1−v − ηF
)
χ
η
, ρv=
1
1− v
(1− ηF )
1 + ηF
η
− σ +(1−τ
1−v − ηF
)
χ
η
.
3.3 Simple parametric examples
Although our formulas are general, it is illustrative to work through a few simple examples. Below
we provide two parametric examples with n symmetric firms and constant marginal cost: χ = 0.
In this case, the pass-through expressions are simplified to
ρt =
1
(1− v)
[
1 +
(
1− α
F
)
θ
] , ρv = F − 1
F
{
(1− v)
[
1 +
(
1− α
F
)
θ
]}
under price competition, where θ = /F , and
ρt =
1
(1− v) [1 + (1− σ
θ
)
θ
] , ρv = 1− ηF
(1− v) [1 + (1− σ
θ
)
θ
]
under quantity competition, where θ = ηF/η.
3.3.1 Linear demand
One is the case wherein each firm faces the following linear demand, qj(p1, ..., pn) = b − λpj +
µ
∑
j′ 6=j pj′ , where b > mc and λ > (n−1)µ ≥ 0, implying that all firms produce substitutes and µ
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measures the degree of substitutability (firms are effectively monopolists when µ = 0).21,22 Under
symmetric pricing, the industry’s demand is thus given by q(p) = b− [λ− (n− 1)µ]p. The inverse
demand system is given by
pj(qj,q−j) =
λ− (n− 2)µ
(λ+ µ) [λ− (n− 1)µ] (b− qj) +
µ
(λ+ µ) [λ− (n− 1)µ]
[∑
j′ 6=j
(b− qj′)
]
,
implying that p(q) = (b − q)/[λ − (n − 1)µ] under symmetric production. Obviously, both the
direct and the indirect demand curvatures are zero: α = 0, σ = 0. Thus, the pass-through rates
are simply given by
ρt =
1
(1− v) (1 + θ) , ρv =
F − 1
F (1− v) (1 + θ)
under price competition, where θ = [λ − (n − 1)µ]/λ, and F = λ(p/q) (where p and q are the
equilibrium price and output under price setting), and
ρt =
1
(1− v) (1 + θ) , ρv =
1− ηF
(1− v) (1 + θ)
under quantity competition, where θ = [λ−(n−2)µ]/(λ+µ) and ηF = {[λ−(n−2)µ](q/p)}/{(λ+
µ)[λ− (n− 1)µ]} (where q and p are the equilibrium output and price under quantity setting).
Now, from Propositions 1 and 2, the marginal cost of public funds and the incidence are given
by
MCt =
(1− v) θ +  τ
1 + (1− v)θ −  τ , MCv =
(1− v)θ + τ
(1−v)(1+θ)
F−1 + v − τ
21These linear demands are derived by maximizing the representative consumer’s net utility, U(q1, ..., qn) −∑n
j=1 pqj , with respect to q1, ..., and qn. See Vives (1999, pp. 145-6) for details.
22In our notation below, the demand in symmetric equilibrium is given by qj(pj , p−j) = b− λpj + µ(n− 1)p−j ,
whereas it is written as
qj(pj , p−j) =
α
1 + γ(n− 1) −
1 + γ(n− 2)
(1− γ)[1 + γ(n− 1)]pj +
γ(n− 1)
(1− γ)[1 + γ(n− 1)]p−j
in Ha¨ckner and Herzing’s (2016) notation, where γ∈[0, 1] is the parameter that measures substitutability be-
tween (symmetric) products. Thus, if our (b, λ, µ) is determined by b = α/[1 + γ(n − 1)], λ = [1 + γ(n −
2)]/ {(1− γ)[1 + γ(n− 1)]}, and µ = γ/ {(1− γ)[1 + γ(n− 1)]}, given Ha¨ckner and Herzing’s (2016) (α, γ), then
our results below can be expressed by Ha¨ckner and Herzing’s (2016) notation as well. Note here that our formula-
tion is more flexible in the sense that the number of the parameters is three. This is because the coefficient for the
own price is normalized to one: pj(qj , q−j) = α − qj − γ(n − 1)q−j , which is analytically innocuous, and Ha¨ckner
and Herzing’s (2016) γ is the normalized parameter.
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Table I: Elasticities, Conduct Indices, and Curvatures
(a) Linear Demand
Price setting Quantity setting
 = [λ− (n− 1)µ]
(
p
q
)
η = 1
λ−(n−1)µ
(
q
p
)
F = λ
(
p
q
)
ηF =
λ−(n−2)µ
(λ+µ)[λ−(n−1)µ]
(
q
p
)
θ = /F = 1− (n− 1)
(
µ
λ
)
θ = ηF/η =
λ−(n−2)µ
λ+µ
α = 0 σ = 0
(b) Logit Demand
Price setting Quantity setting
 = β(1− ns)p η = 1
β(1−ns)p
F = β(1− s)p ηF = 1−(n−1)sβ(1−ns)p
θ = /F =
1−ns
1−s θ = ηF/η = 1− (n− 1) s
α = (2ns−3)ns
1−ns p σ =
1−2ns
1−ns
It =
1
2(1− v)[1− (n− 1)(µ/λ)] , Iv =
F − 1
(1− v)[2− F (1− θ)]
under price competition, with  = [λ− (n− 1)µ](p/q) is additionally provided, where p and q are
the equilibrium price and output under price setting, and
MCt =
(1− v) θ + 1
η
τ
1 + (1− v)θ − 1
η
τ
, MCv =
(1− v)θ + 1
η
τ
(1−v)(1+θ)
1−ηF + v −
1
η
τ
It =
λ+ µ
2(1− v)[λ− (n− 2)µ] , Iv =
1− ηF
(1− v)[ηF + (2− ηF )θ]
under quantity competition, with 1/η = [λ − (n − 1)µ](p/q) is additionally provided, where p
and q are the equilibrium price and output under quantity setting. Thus, it suffices to solve for
the equilibrium price and output under both settings to compute the pass-through rate and the
marginal cost of public funds for all four cases.
Table I (a) summarizes the key variables that determine the pass-through rates and the
marginal costs of public funds. It is verified that under both price and quantity competition,
∂θ/∂n < 0 and ∂θ/∂µ < 0. To focus on the roles of these two parameters, n and µ, which directly
affect the degree of competition, we employ the following simplification to compute the ratio p/q
in equilibrium: b = 1, mc = 0, and λ = 1 (see Appendix A.2.7 for the actual expressions of the
19
equilibrium prices and outputs under price and quantity competition).
The top two panels in Figure II illustrate how ρt and ρv behave as the number of firms (n; the
left) or the sustainability parameter (µ; the left) increases, with the superscript denoting price (P )
or quantity (Q) setting. Similarly, the middle and the bottom panels draw MCt and MCv, and
It and Iv, respectively. It is observed that the ad valorem tax pass-through rates are close to zero
because in this case both F and ηF are close to 1. As competition becomes fiercer, both ρ
P
t and
ρQt become larger, although the discrepancy also becomes larger. In the case of linear demand, the
difference in the mode of competition does not yield a significant difference in each of the three
measures. As is verified by Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001b), the ad valorem tax is more
efficient than the unit tax: the dashed lines in the two middle panels lie below the solid lines.
This ranking is related inversely to the pass-through and the incidence: as the pass-through or
the incidence becomes larger, the marginal cost of public funds becomes smaller.
3.3.2 Logit demand
The next parametric example is the logit demand. Each firm j = 1, ..., n faces the following
demand: sj(p) = exp(δ − βpj)/[1 +
∑
j´=1,...,n exp(δ − βpj´)]∈(0, 1), where δ is the (symmetric)
product-specific utility and β > 0 is the responsiveness to the price.23 We define s0 = 1 −∑
j=1,...,nsj < 1 as the share of all outside goods. Table I (b) summarizes the key variables that
determine the pass-through rates and the marginal costs of public funds. We need to numerically
solve for the equilibrium price and market share under both settings to compute the pass-through
rate, the marginal cost of public funds, and incidence for all four cases. To focus on the two
parameters, β and n, we assume that δ = 1 and mc = 0. Because ∂sj(p)/∂pj|p=(p,...,p) = −βs(1−
s), the first-order conditions for the symmetric equilibrium price and the market share satisfy
p − t/(1 − v) = 1/[β(1 − s)] and s = exp(1 − βp)/[1 + n exp(1 − βp)]. If p and s are solved
23Here, qj(p1, ..., pn) is derived by aggregating over individuals who choose product j (the total number of
individuals is normalized to one): individual i’s net utility from consuming j is given by uij = δ − βpj + ε˜ij ,
whereas ui0 = ε˜i0 is the net utility from consuming nothing, and ε˜i0, ε˜i1, ..., ε˜in are independently and identically
distributed according to the Type I extreme value distribution for all individuals. See Anderson, de Palma, and
Thisse (1992, pp. 39-45) for details. We work in terms of market share variables sj and s, instead of qj and q, which
is consistent with the usual notation in the industrial organization literature.
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Figure II: Pass-through rate (top), marginal cost of public funds (middle), and incidence (bottom)
with linear demand. The horizontal axes on the left and the right panels correspond to the number
of firms (n) and the substitutability parameter (µ), respectively.
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Figure III: Pass-through rates (top), marginal costs of public funds (middle), and incidence (bot-
tom) with logit demands. The horizontal axes on the left and the right panels are the number of
firms (n) and the price coefficient (β), respectively.
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numerically, then , F , θ and α can also be numerically computed.
24 Next, we consider the inverse
demands under quantity competition. Then, as in Berry (1994), firm j’s inverse demand is given
by pj(s) = [δ− log(sj/s0)]/β, which implies that ∂pj(s)/∂sj|s=(s,...,s) = −[1−(n−1)s]/[βs(1−ns)].
Thus, the first-order conditions for the symmetric equilibrium price and the market share satisfy
p− t/(1− v) = [1− (n− 1)s]/[β(1−ns)] and p = [1− log(s/[1−ns])]/β. Then, as above, η, ηF , θ
and σ are computed by numerically solving the first-order conditions for p and s. Interestingly, it
is verified that in symmetric equilibrium under quantity setting, ∂p/∂n = 0: the equilibrium price
is the same irrespective of the number of firms, whereas the individual market share is decreasing
in the number of firms: ∂s/∂n < 0. On the other hand, both the equilibrium price and market
share are decreasing in the price coefficient, β.
Figure III illustrates the pass-through rate, the marginal cost of public funds, and the incidence,
in analogy with Figure II. The right panels now show the variables’ dependence on the price
coefficient β. Overall, as in the case of linear demand, an increase in the ad valorem tax has a small
impact on these measures for each of n and β, whereas an increase in the unit tax has a large effect.
However, there are important differences between the cases of linear and logit demand. First, the
unit tax pass-through under quantity competition ρQt is decreasing in the number of firms. To
understand this, compare the difference in the denominators of ρPt = 1/{(1−v) [1 + (1− α/F )θ]}
and ρQt = (1 − v) [1 + θ − σ]. As θ decreases (i.e., as competition becomes fiercer), the second
term in the denominator of ρPt decreases, and thereby ρ
P
t increases as n increases. However,
θ − σ increases as θ decreases, and thus ρQt decreases. This difference in the denominators is also
reflected in the fact that IQt is decreasing in n as well. Naturally, MC
Q
t is decreasing in n as in the
case of linear demand because 1/ρQt becomes larger (see the formulas in Proposition 1). Second,
while the pass-through rate and the incidence increase as β increases, the marginal cost of public
funds is also increasing in contrast to the case of linear demands. The reason is that the effect
on MC of decreases in θ is weaker than the effect of the increase in : the industry’s demand
becomes elastic quickly as consumers become more sensitive to a price increase.
24It can be verified that sj(·;p−j) is convex as long as sj < 1/2 because ∂2sj/∂p2j = −β(∂sj/∂pj)(1− 2sj) > 0.
However, the second-order condition is always satisfied because ∂2pij/∂p
2
j = −βsj < 0. In symmetric equilibrium
with δ = 1 and mc = 0, the largest market share is attained as 1/(n+ 1) when the equilibrium price is zero, which
implies that the market share of the outside goods s0 is no less than each firm’s market share: s0 > s.
23
4 Multi-Dimensional Pass-Through Framework
Now, we generalize our previous results to a more general specification of taxation that involves
multiple tax instruments. We define two different types of pass-through vectors: (i) the pass-
through rate vector and (ii) pass-through quasi-elasticity. We study their properties and show that
they play a central role in evaluating welfare changes in response to changes in taxation.
4.1 Pass-through, conduct index, and welfare: A general discussion
4.1.1 Generalized pass-through and tax sensitivities
Consider a tax structure under which a firm’s tax payment is expressed as φ(p, q,T), where
T ≡ (T1, ..., Td) is a d-dimensional vector of tax instruments25 so that the firm’s profit in symmetric
equilibrium is written as pi = pq − c(q) − φ(p, q,T). Note that the argument so far is a special
case of two dimensional pass-through: φ(p, q,T) = tq + vpq, where T = (t, v). The components
of the (per-firm) tax revenue gradient vector ∇φ(p, q,T) are
φT`(p, q,T) ≡
∂φ(p, q,T)
∂T`
.
Here, as in other parts of the paper, we use the symbol ∇ for the d-dimensional gradient with
respect to T. The arguments p and q in φ(p, q,T) are treated as fixed for the purposes of taking
this gradient. We also denote by f a vector components φT`(p, q,T)/q. We denote the equilibrium
price function26 by p? (T) and its gradient, the pass-through rate vector, by ρ˜ ≡ ∇p? (T) . Further,
we use the components of the f and ρ˜ to define the pass-through quasi-elasticity vector as
ρ ≡ (ρT1 , ..., ρTd) , ρT` ≡ ρ˜T`fT` = qφT`(p, q,T) ∂p
?
∂T`
.
Note that the components of ρ are all dimensionless. We define the (first-order) price sensitivity
ν of the tax revenue and the (first-order) quantity sensitivity τ of the (per-firm) tax revenue as
25To be precise, φ(p, q,T) represents a simplified notation for a function φ(p, q, T1, ..., Td) with d+ 2 arguments.
26Unlike the inverse demand function p (q), the function p? (T) takes the vector of taxes as arguments, and its
functional value is the price in the resulting equilibrium.
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follows:
ν(p, q,T) ≡ 1
q
φp(p, q,T), τ(p, q,T) ≡
1
p
φq(p, q,T),
and their derivatives are
νT`(p, q,T) ≡
∂ν(p, q,T)
∂T`
, τT`(p, q,T) ≡
∂τ(p, q,T)
∂T`
.
The analogous definitions for the second-order sensitivities are:
ν(2)(p, q,T) ≡ p
q
∂2φ(p, q,T)
∂p2
, τ (2)(p, q,T) ≡ q
p
∂2φ(p, q,T)
∂q2
, κ(p, q,T) ≡ ∂
2φ(p, q,T)
∂p ∂q
.
The first-order and second-order sensitivities are dimensionless, as are the components of ρ. In
this section, we keep the same definition of the elasticities  and η as before.
4.1.2 Generalized conduct index
We introduce the conduct index θ as a function, independently of the cost-side of the oligopoly
game, so that in equilibrium the following condition holds:
[1− τ − (1− ν) η θ] p = mc. (3)
In the case of unit and ad valorem taxation, this definition reduces to the conduct index defined
earlier (Equation 1), where τ = v + t/p and ν = v: this is the reason why we can keep using
τ below. In principle, there are many possible definitions that agree with the earlier definition
in the case of unit and ad valorem taxation. However, we find the specification of Equation 3
particularly convenient.
4.1.3 Relationships for the pass-through vector components
We now establish the following relationship for the relative size of pass-through vector component.
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Proposition 8. The pass-through rates and quasi-elasticities satisfy 27
ρ˜T`
ρ˜T`′
=
τT`′ − νT`′η θ
τT` − νT`η θ
,
ρT`
ρT`′
=
fT`′
fT`
τT` − η θ νT`
τT`′ − η θ νT`′
.
The proposition is proven in Appendix A.3.1. Since the components have known proportions,
we can write them using a common factor pρ(0) as
ρ˜T` = (τT` − νT`η θ) pρ(0), ρT` =
p
fT`
(τT` − νT`η θ) ρ(0), (4)
with the factor ρ(0) determined in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. The value of the factor ρ(0) introduced in Equation (4) is given by:
1
ρ(0)
= 1− κ+ τ (2) + (1− τ)χ+
[
ν − κ+ ην(2) + (ω − η − χ) (1− ν)
]
θ, (5)
where ω ≡ q (ηθ)′/ (ηθ) , with the prime denoting a derivative with respect to the quantity q.
The proof is in Appendix A.3.2.28
4.1.4 Welfare changes and their relationship to pass-through vectors
Now, we establish the general formulas for the marginal cost of public fund and incidence in
the multi-dimensional pass-through framework. Welfare component changes in response to an
infinitesimal change in taxes can be found as follows. The (per-firm) consumer surplus change in
27If the denominators are zero, the fractions become ill-defined. In that case, of course, the statement does not
apply.
28If φ(p, q,T) = tq + vpq, then τ = (t+ vp)/p = t/p+ v and ν = vq/q = v. First, ρt =
q
∂φ/∂t ρ˜t =
q
q ρ˜t = ρ˜t, and
ρv =
q
∂φ/∂v ρ˜t =
q
pq ρ˜t =
1
p ρ˜t. Next, ρt =
pq
∂φ/∂t
[
τ t − νt
(
θ
D
)]
ρ(0) = ρ(0) because τ t = 1/p and νt = 0. Then,
1
ρ(0)
= [(1− κ︸ ︷︷ ︸)
=1−v
+ Dτ (2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ (1− τ)
(
D
S
)
] +
ν − κ+ ην(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
(
ω − 1
D
− 1
S
)
(1− ν︸ ︷︷ ︸)
=1−v
 θ
= (1− v)
{[
1 +
1− τ
1− v
(
D
S
)]
−
(
1
D
+
1
S
)
θ + Dq
∂(θ/D)
∂q
}
since κ(p, q,T) ≡ ∂2φ(p,q,T)∂p ∂q = v, τ (2)(p, q,T) ≡ qp · ∂
2φ(p,q,T)
∂q2 = 0, and ν(2)(p, q,T) ≡ pq · ∂
2φ(p,q,T)
∂p2 = 0.
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response to an infinitesimal change dT` in the tax T` is
dCS = −qdp = −qρ˜T`dT`,
which means that in vector notation, 1
q
∇CS = −ρ˜. The change in (per-firm) producer surplus is
dPS = d (pq − c (q)− φ(p, q,T)) = [φT`(p, q,T)− (1− ν) (1− θ) ρ˜T`] dT`,
where we utilize Equation (3) to eliminate the marginal cost. In vector notation, this is 1
q
∇PS =
(1− ν) (1− θ) ρ˜− f , since f = 1
q
∇φ(p, q,T). The change in tax revenue is
dR = φp(p, q,T)dp+ φq(p, q,T)dq + φT`(p, q,T)dT` =
[
φT`(p, q,T)− (τ − ν) ρ˜T`
]
dT`.
In vector notation, 1
q
∇R = f − (τ − ν) ρ˜. Finally, for the change in social welfare, we have
dW = (p−mc) dq = [τ + θ (1− ν)] ρ˜T`dT`.
In vector notation, 1
q
∇W = − [τ + θ (1− ν)] ρ˜.
Note that the welfare components CS (T) , PS (T) , R (T), and W (T) = CS (T) +PS (T) +
R (T) are all treated as functions of taxes only and represent the equilibrium outcomes. This is
different from the tax revenue function φ (p, q,T), which has also p and q as arguments and which
is specified by the government irrespective of the equilibrium. We summarize these findings in the
following proposition.
Proposition 10. The tax gradients of consumer surplus, producer surplus, tax revenue, and social
welfare with respect to the taxes all belong to a two-dimensional vector space spanned by f and ρ˜.
The precise linear combinations of f and ρ˜ are
1
q
∇CS = −ρ˜,
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1q
∇PS = (1− ν) (1− θ) ρ˜− f ,
1
q
∇R = f + (ν − τ) ρ˜,
1
q
∇W = − [(1− ν) θ + τ ] ρ˜.
These relationships, considered component-wise, immediately imply the following results for
welfare change ratios and generalize Propositions 1 and 2.29
Proposition 11. The marginal cost of public funds of a tax T`, MCT` = (∇W )T` / (∇R)T`, is
MCT` =
(1− ν) θ + τ
1
ρT`
+ ν − τ .
The incidence of this tax, IT` = (∇CS)T` / (∇PS)T`, equals:
IT` =
1
1
ρT`
− (1− ν) (1− θ) .
Similarly, the social incidence, SIT` = (∇W )T` / (∇PS)T`, equals:
SIT` =
(1− ν) θ + τ
1
ρT`
− (1− ν) (1− θ) .
4.2 Pass-through, conduct index, and welfare: special cases
The results of the previous subsection contain our results for ad valorem and unit taxes as special
cases, but provide much greater generality, since the taxes (government interventions) may be
specified in a very flexible way.
4.2.1 Exogenous competition and depreciating licenses
Weyl and Fabinger’s (2013) results under symmetric oligopoly can be interpreted as special cases
of the present results. In particular, Weyl and Fabinger’s (2013) analysis considers either unit
29Remember that the T` component of the vector f is φT`(p, q,T)/q =ρ˜T`/ρT` .
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taxes or exogenous competition (an exogenous quantity supplied to the market). The case of unit
taxes is clearly included in the present results, which has motivated this paper. At the same time,
it turns out that the case of exogenous competition is included as well. The reasoning is as follows.
Consider a tax T1 = q˜ of the form: φ (p, q, q˜) = q˜ p+ c(q − q˜)− c(q). Then, the firm’s profit is
given by:
pq − c (q)− φ (p, q, q˜) = p (q − q˜) + c(q − q˜).
The firm, therefore, has the same profit function as in the case of exogenous competition q˜ in
Weyl and Fabinger (2013). Proposition 11 above (specialized to constant marginal cost and zero
initial q˜) then implies the social incidence result in Principle of Incidence 3 in Weyl and Fabinger
(2013, p. 548).
Similarly, the relationships between pass-through of unit taxes and of exogenous competition
are implied by the general result of Proposition 8 for the tax specification T1 = t, T2 = q˜,
φ (p, q, t, q˜) = tq + q˜ p+ c(q − q˜)− c(q).
To obtain the absolute size of the two types of pass-through, one can straightforwardly use Propo-
sition 9. More generally, φ is extended as
φ = c (q − q˜) + v (q − q˜) p(q) + (1− v)q˜p(q) + t (q − q˜)− c(q),
where an ad valorem tax is also considered. As an example, one can think of a government which
procures goods from abroad and supplies them to the market in order to lower domestic prices.
In the special case of a monopolist with constant marginal cost, the mathematics allow for
another interesting interpretation: It is isomorphic to the case of “depreciating licenses” in Weyl
and Zhang (2017). Depreciating licenses correspond to a tax scheme where the owner of an asset
announces a reservation price at which she is willing to sell it and gets taxed a fixed fraction of
that prices. Another agent in the economy may buy the asset at the announced price. The owner
then faces a tradeoff between announcing a low price and paying low taxes and announcing a high
29
price in order to be able to keep the asset and derive utility from it. The optimization problem
then leads to exactly the same mathematical form as the problem of a monopolist with constant
marginal cost facing exogenous competition. We include a more detailed explanation in Appendix
A.3.3.30
4.2.2 Sales restrictions
Governments often regulate when, where, and to whom products may be sold. For example, there
are restrictions on weekend sales, store locations, etc. A simple way of modeling this situation is to
assume that due to the restrictions a firm loses a fixed proportion of its customers. If the absence
of the regulation and taxation, the profit function is p (q) q − c (q). The new profit function will
be (1− v) p([1 +κ]q)q− tq− c (q), where 1− 1/ (1 + κ) is the fraction of customers lost. The only
change is in the argument of the inverse demand function: for the firm to sell quantity q, each
remaining customer needs to buy (1 + κ) times more than in the absence of the regulation, and
the price would have to be correspondingly lower. This change may be described using as:
φ (p, q, t, v, κ) = (1− (1− v)h (q, κ)) pq + tq, h (q, κ) ≡ p (q)− p ((1 + κ) q)
p (q)
.
For demand with constant elasticity , h (q, κ) = 1− (1 + κ)−1/, independently of q.
4.2.3 Tax evasion/tax avoidance and concealment costs
Tax evasion, clearly, is a very important problem in many situations since economic agents do not
always strictly follow the law (Choi, Furusawa, and Ishikawa 2017).
For simplicity, consider a firm that needs to pay an ad valorem tax vp˜q, where p˜ is the price
reported to the government and may differ from the true price p. We capture the cost associated
with deceiving the government by introducing a concealment cost of the form:
1
4λ
p−ζ(p˜− p)2q1−ξ.
30We thank Glen Weyl for suggesting this relationship between Weyl and Zhang (2017) and our analysis.
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The firm then chooses the reported price p˜ to minimize the sum of these two additional costs:
vp˜q +
1
4λ
p−ζq1−ξ(p˜− p)2.
The corresponding first-order condition implies p˜ = p−2λvpζqξ, which gives the effective additional
cost
pqv − λv2pζq1+ξ.
φ (p, q, t, v, λ) = tq + pqv − λv2pζq1+ξ
φ˜ (p, q, t, v, λ) = tq + pqv − 2λv2pζq1+ξ
The government needs to pay additional enforcement cost inversely related to λ, which needs to
be remembered in the welfare analysis.
5 Heterogeneous Firms
In this section, we extend our results to the case of n heterogeneous firms (i.e. asymmetric firms),
where each firm i controls a strategic variable σi, which could be, for example, the price or quantity
of its product. We allow for the tax function φi (pi, qi,T) to depend explicitly on the identity of the
firm; we write fi T` (pi, qi,T) =
1
qi
∂
∂T`
φi (pi, qi,T) for its derivative with respect to tax T`. Similarly,
the sensitivities τ i (pi, qi,T), νi (pi, qi,T), etc., now also have the firm index i. The marginal cost
mci (qi) of firm i is also allowed to depend on the identity of the firm, and we denote its elasticity
χi (qi) ≡ qimc′i (qi) /mci (qi) .
5.1 Pricing strength index and pass-through
We define the pricing strength index ψi (q) of firm i to be a function independent of the cost side
of the economic problem such that the first-order condition for firm i is:
{1− τ i (pi (q) , qi,T)− ψi (q) [1− νi (pi (q) , qi,T)]} pi (q) = mc (qi) .
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In the special case of symmetric firms, this definition reduces to ψi = η θ.
We express the pass-through rate in terms of these pricing strength indices. Specifically, the
pass-through rate is an n× d matrix ρ˜ with rows ρ˜T` ≡ ∂p/∂T` and elements ρ˜i T` = ∂pi/∂T`. It
is shown that the pass-through rate equals
ρ˜T` = b
−1 . ιT` , (6)
where the factors on the right-hand side are defined as follows. The matrix b is an n× n matrix,
independent of the choice of T`, with elements
bij =
[
1− κi −
(
1− νi − ν(2)i
)
ψi
]
δij − (1− νi)ψiΨij
+
{
τ (2)i + νiψi − κi + [1− τ i − (1− νi)ψi]χi
}
ij,
where δij is the Kronecker delta, and
ij = − pi
qi
∂qi (p)
∂pj
, Ψij =
pi
ψi
∂ψi (q (p))
∂pj
.
For each tax T`, ιT` is an n-dimensional vector with components
ιi T` = pi
∂τ i (pi, qi,T)
∂T`
− pi ψi
∂νi (pi, qi,T)
∂T`
.
In the case of symmetric firms and at symmetric prices, the pass-through rate expression in
Equation (6) agrees with the expression represented by Equations (4) and (5) in Section 4.31
To generalize the notion of pass-through quasi-elasticity to the case of heterogeneous firms, we
define the pass-through quasi-elasticity matrix ρ as an n× d matrix with elements
ρi T` =
1
fi T` (pi, qi,T)
∂pi
∂T`
,
31To confirm this agreement, note that at symmetric prices,
∑n
j=1 Ψij = −ω. Note also that ii (p) |p=(p,...,p) =
F (p), and for j 6= i, ij (p) |p=(p,...,p) = − 1n−1 C(p).
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and with rows denoted ρT` .
5.2 Welfare changes
In the following, for each i, i is an n-dimensional vector with its j-th component equal to ij. For
the tax gradients of welfare components corresponding to individual firms we obtain:
1
qi
∇CSi = −ei.ρ˜,
1
qi
∇PSi = (1− νi) (ei − ψi i) .ρ˜− fi,
1
qi
∇Ri = fi + (νi ei − τ i i) .ρ˜,
1
qi
∇Wi = − [τ i + ψi (1− νi)] i.ρ˜.
The corresponding gradients of total welfare components are then obtained by adding up contri-
butions from individual firms. For example, ∇CS = ∑ni=1∇CSi. Denoting the total quantity as
Q ≡∑ni=1 qi, this means that 1Q∇CS is a weighted average of −ei.ρ˜, with the weights proportional
to qi. The arguments for the other welfare components are similar. This generalizes Proposition
10 above.
We can also consider ratios of welfare changes corresponding to some tax T`:
MCi T` =
[τ i + (1− νi) ψi] ρi T`
1
ρi T`
+ νi − τ i ρi T`
,
Ii T` =
1
1
ρi T`
− (1− νi) (1− ψi ρi T`)
,
SIi T` =
[τ i + (1− νi) ψi] ρi T`
1
ρi T`
− (1− νi) (1− ψi ρi T`)
,
where ρi T` ≡ i.ρ˜T`/ρ˜i T` = i.ρT`/ρi T` . The ratios of the corresponding total welfare changes will
be weighted averages of these firm-specific ratios. The weights correspond to the sizes of the
denominators times qi. For example, MCT` will lie between miniMCi T` and maxiMCi T` . The
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same reasoning also holds for the other ratios. This generalizes Proposition 11 above.
5.3 Conduct index and welfare changes
For heterogeneous firms, we introduce the conduct index of firm i so that
θi = −
∑n
j=1 {pj [1− τ j (pj, qj,T)]−mc (qj)} dqjdσi∑n
j=1 [1− νj (pj, qj,T)] qj dpjdσi
holds. In the special case of only unit taxation, this definition reduces to Weyl and Fabinger’s
(2013, p. 552) Equation (4). In the special case of symmetric firms the definition reduces to our
Equation (3) with θi = θ.
The conduct index θi is closely connected to the pricing strength index ψi, but not as closely
as it would be in the case of symmetric oligopoly. Using the definitions of the indices, it is shown
that
θi = −
∑n
j=1 (1− νj)ψj pj dqjdσi∑n
j=1 (1− νj) qj dpjdσi
.
For symmetric oligopoly, this equation reduces simply to θ = ψ.
The conduct index is used to express welfare component changes in response to infinitesimal
changes in taxes. The relationships are a bit more complicated than in the case of using the pricing
strength index: they can be expressed as follows. We define the price response to an infinitesimal
change in the strategic variable σk of firm j as
ζ ij =
dpi
dσj
.
Since the vectors ζ i1, ζ i2, ... , ζ in form a basis in the n-dimensional vector space to which ρ˜i T` for
a given ` belongs, we can write ρ˜i T` as a linear combination of them for some coefficients λi T` :
ρ˜i T` =
n∑
j=1
λj T`ζ ij.
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For changes in consumer and producer surplus, we obtain:
dCS
dT`
= −
n∑
i=1
qiρ˜i T` = −
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
qiζ ij
)
λj T` ,
dPS
dT`
= −
n∑
i=1
fi T` (pi, qi,T)−
n∑
j=1
ζˆj (1− θj)λj T` ,
where we used the notation
ζˆj ≡
n∑
i=1
[1− νi (pi, qi,T)] qi ζ ij.
These surplus change expressions represent a generalization of the surplus expressions in Weyl
and Fabinger’s (2013) Section 5.
5.4 Aggregative games
In the case of oligopoly in the form of aggregative games, where all other firms’ actions are
summarized as an aggregator in each firm’s profit, we can further manipulate the above formulas
for pricing strength and conduct indices.32 We identify the firm’s strategic variable σi with an
action ai ≡ σi the firm can take, which contributes to an aggregator A =
∑n
i=1 ai. The prices and
quantities are functions of just two arguments: pi (A, ai) and qi (A, ai). Their derivatives that take
into account the dependence of A on the action of firm i are
dqj
dσi
=
∂qj
∂ai
+
∂qj
∂A
and
dpj
dσi
=
∂pj
∂ai
+
∂pj
∂A
.
The firm’s first-order condition is:
0 =
(
∂pj
∂ai
(A, ai) +
∂pj
∂A
(A, ai)
)
qi (A, ai) (νi (pi (A, ai) , qi (A, ai) ,T)− 1) +
(
∂qj
∂ai
(A, ai) +
∂qj
∂A
(A, ai)
)
(mc (qi (A, ai)) + pi (A, ai) (τ i (pi (A, ai),qi (A, ai),T)− 1)) ,
which gives us a relatively simple expression for the pricing strength index:
ψi (A, ai) = −
qi (A, ai)
pi (A, ai)
∂pj
∂ai
(A, ai) +
∂pj
∂A
(A, ai)
∂qj
∂ai
(A, ai) +
∂qj
∂A
(A, ai)
.
32Here, we consider a setup in Anderson, Erkal, and Piccinin’s (2016) Section 2.
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The expression for the conduct index also simplifies:
θi =
n∑
j=1
wj
γj (A, ai)
γj (A, aj)
,
where wi is a normalized version of unnormalized “weights” w˜j,
wi ≡ w˜i∑n
j=1 w˜j
, w˜j ≡ (1− νj) qj (A, aj)
(
∂pj
∂ai
(A, ai) +
∂pj
∂A
(A, ai)
)
,
and
γj (A, ai) ≡
∂qj
∂ai
(A, ai) +
∂qj
∂A
(A, ai) .
These simplified formulas would be used for further analysis of pass-through and welfare in ag-
gregative oligopoly games.
6 Pass-Through and Welfare under Production-Cost and
Taxation Changes
In the previous sections, we have studied changes in taxation, but not changes in production costs.
Here, we generalize our main results to incorporate both taxation and production costs. As shown
below, the generalization to production cost changes turns out to be straightforward. These more
general formulas may be applied to a range of economic situations such as cost changes due to
exchange rate movements or movements in the world prices of commodities.
The additional cost to the firm is denoted φ (p, q,T) as before, but the tax bill of firm i, denoted
φ˜ (p, q,T), is different, in general. Here T is a vector of interventions (by the government or by
external circumstances), which may or may not include traditional taxes. We recover the previous
case of only taxation by setting φ˜ (p, q,T) = φ (p, q,T). If all of the additional cost to the firm
comes from the production side, we have φ˜ (p, q,T) = 0. In general, φ (p, q,T)− φ˜ (p, q,T) is the
production part of the additional cost φ (p, q,T).
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6.1 Symmetric firms
In addition to the notation used in the previous section, we define f˜ = 1
q
∇φ˜(p, q,T). First, we
obtain a generalization of the formulas for the tax gradients of welfare components in Proposition
10. The equilibrium outcome depends only on the additional cost φ (p, q,T) and not on its split
between taxes and production costs. For this reason, the formulas for consumer and producer
surplus will be unchanged. The government revenue and therefore also total social welfare depends
on φ˜ (p, q,T). In the formula for the gradient of government revenue, f will be replaced by f˜ , and
the formula for social welfare will be adjusted to reflect this difference. Hence, the generalization
of the results in Proposition 10 is:
1
q
∇CS = −ρ˜,
1
q
∇PS = (1− ν) (1− θ) ρ˜− f ,
1
q
∇R = f˜ + (ν − τ) ρ˜,
1
q
∇W = −[(1− ν) θ + τ ]ρ˜ + f˜ − f .
We further define gT` ≡ f˜T`/fT` , which represents the fraction of an increase in additional cost
(φ) to the firm (due to a change in the tax parameter T`) that is collected by the government in
the form of taxes (φ˜). In other words, gT` is the government’s share in increases of the additional
costs induced by marginal changes in T`. If φ is a pure tax, then gT` = 1, and if φ is a pure
production cost with no tax component, then gT` = 0. By taking ratios of the components of the
tax gradients above, we obtain a generalization of Proposition 11: The marginal cost of public
funds associated with intervention T`, MCT` = (∇W )T` / (∇R)T` , is
MCT` =
1−gT`
ρT`
+ (1− ν) θ + τ
gT`
ρT`
+ ν − τ .
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The incidence of this intervention, IT` = (∇CS)T` / (∇PS)T` , equals:
IT` =
1
1
ρT`
− (1− ν) (1− θ) .
Similarly, the social incidence, SIT` = (∇W )T` / (∇PS)T` , equals:
SIT` =
1−gT`
ρT`
+ (1− ν) θ + τ
1
ρT`
− (1− ν) (1− θ) .
6.2 Heterogeneous firms
The adjustments to our formulas needed to generalize the results of Subsection 5.2 are analogous
to the case of symmetric firms we just discussed. For each firm i, we define f˜i =
1
q
∇φ˜i(p, q,T).
For the welfare gradients, we obtain:
1
qi
∇CSi = −ei.ρ˜,
1
qi
∇PSi = (1− νi) (ei − ψi i) .ρ˜− fi,
1
qi
∇Ri = (νi ei − τ i i) .ρ˜ + f˜i,
1
qi
∇Wi = − [τ i + ψi (1− νi)] i.ρ˜ + f˜i − fi.
Similarly, for each firm i, we define gi T` ≡ f˜i T`/fi T` . For the firm-specific welfare change ratios,
we obtain:
MCi T` =
1−gi T`
ρi T`
+ (τ i + (1− νi) ψi) ρi T`
gi T`
ρi T`
+ νi − τ i ρi T`
,
Ii T` =
1
1
ρi T`
− (1− νi) (1− ψi ρi T`)
,
SIi T` =
1−gT`
ρi T`
+ (τ i + (1− νi) ψi) ρi T`
1
ρi T`
− (1− νi) (1− ψi ρi T`)
.
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7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we characterize the welfare measures of taxation and other external changes in
oligopoly with a general specification of competition, market demand and production cost. For
symmetric oligopoly, we first derive formulas for marginal welfare losses from unit and ad valorem
taxation, MCt and MCv, using the unit tax pass-through rate ρt and the ad valorem tax pass-
through semi-elasticity ρv (Proposition 1) as well as the formulas for tax incidence, It and Iv
(Proposition 2). We then show that ρv can be expressed in terms of ρt (Proposition 3). These
relationships are used to derive sufficient statistics for MCt and MCv (Proposition 4). The pass-
through is also characterized, generalizing Weyl and Fabinger’s (2013) formula (Proposition 5). In
the case of price or quantity competition, we explain how ρt and ρv can be written only in terms
of the demand elasticities, the demand curvatures, and the marginal cost elasticity (Propositions
6 and 7). We have discussed the relationships to other quantities of interest, as well as illustrative
special cases.
The second part of the paper extends the results beyond the two-dimensional taxation problem.
Specifically, we show that the previous results have a very natural generalization to a general
specification of the tax revenue function as a function parameterized by a vector of tax parameters
(Propositions 8, 9, 10, and 11). We further discuss an extension of our analysis to the case of
asymmetric oligopoly, where the firms face different costs and possibly also different taxes (Section
5).33,34 In addition, we provide a generalization of our results to the case of changes in both
production costs and taxes (Section 6).
As already mentioned above, it would be possible to extend our analysis to the case of supply
33By allowing (constant) asymmetric marginal costs, Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001b) show that under
quantity competition with homogeneous products (i.e., Cournot competition), ad valorem taxation is still preferable
to unit taxation, although they were not able to verify if the same conclusion held under quantity competition
with product differentiation. However, Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001b) discuss a specific demand system
(with perfectly inelastic individual demand) under which unit taxation is preferable to ad valorem taxation if the
required tax revenue is sufficiently high. We conjecture that one could obtain further generalization by allowing
the conduct index θ to be firm-specific. See also Zimmerman and Carlson (2010) for a parametric analysis of
asymmetric firms.
34Interestingly, Tremblay and Tremblay (2017) study tax incidence in an asymmetric duopoly where one firm
competes in price and the other firm competes in quantity, focusing on unit taxation. The pass-through rates can
be different for the two identical firms (in terms of demand and cost): the quantity-competing firm has a higher
pass-through rate than the price-competing firm has. This is in contrast with the result that the pass-through rate
under price competition is generally higher under quantity competition.
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chains (Peitz and Reisinger 2014). Other possible directions include the case of two-sided platform
competition (White and Weyl 2016; and Tremblay 2018) and the case of the interactive effects of
taxation for multiple imperfectly competitive product markets.35 In addition, our methodology
could be utilized to study other important issues of pricing in general such as the welfare effects of
oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination (Adachi and Fabinger 2018). One may also study,
for example, advertising pass-through (Draganska and Vitorino 2017).36 Free-riding, because of
the spillover effect, may be more or less serious, depending on the conduct index and other related
indices. Furthermore, it would be of interest to develop flexible, but analytically solvable examples
along the lines of Fabinger and Weyl (2018).
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs and discussions for Section 2
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Using Equation (1) to substitute for mc, we first obtain a useful expression for the markup:
p − mc = t + pv + p(1 − v)ηθ. Now consider an infinitesimal change dt in the unit tax that
induces a change dp in the equilibrium price and a change dq in the equilibrium quantity. These
are related by dt = dp/ρt = −η p dq/ (q ρt). The corresponding change in social welfare per firm
is dW = (p−mc) dq = t dq + vp dq + (1 − v)pηθ dq, and the change in tax revenue per firm is
dR = (t+ vp) dq + vq dp + q dt = (t+ vp) dq − vpη dq − ηp dq/ρt. Combining these relationships
gives the result
MCt = −dW
dR
= − t+ vp+ (1− v)pηθ
t+ vp− vpη − 1
ρt
pη
=
(1− v)ηθ + t
p
+ v
1
ρt
η + vη − t
p
− v =
(1− v)θ + τ
1
ρt
+ v − τ .
Next, consider an infinitesimal change dv in the ad valorem tax that induces a change dp in
the equilibrium price and a change dq in the equilibrium quantity, related by dv = dp/(pρv) =
35Among many others, Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) study this issue for perfectly competitive markets.
36The firm’s demand can be modeled as qj = qj(p1, ..., pn; a1, ..., an), where aj is firm j’s investment in advertising.
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−η dq/(qρv). The change in social welfare per firm is again dW = (p−mc) dq = t dq + vp dq +
(1− v)pηθ dq. The change in tax revenue per firm can be written as (t+ vp) dq + vq dp+ pq dv =
(t+ vp) dq − vpη dq − pη dq/ρv. Combining these relationships leads to the result
MCt = −dW
dR
= − t+ vp+ (1− v)pηθ
t+ vp− vpη − 1
ρv
pη
=
(1− v)ηθ + t
p
+ v
1
ρv
η + vη − t
p
− v =
(1− v)θ + τ
1
ρv
+ v − τ .
A.1.2 Intuition behind Proposition 1
The intuition behind Proposition 1 for the case of unit taxation can explained as follows. The
argument for ad valorem taxation is analogous. First, the firm’s per-output profit margin is de-
composed into two parts: (1) tax payment, t+vp = pτ and (2) surplus from imperfect competition,
(1 − v)pηθ. Under imperfect competition, the effects of an increase in unit tax, dt, on the social
welfare can be written as dW = (p−mc)dq, which implies that the firm’s per-output profit margin
serves as a measure for welfare change.37 On the other hand, the effects of an increase in unit
tax, dt, on the tax revenue are:
dR = q dt︸︷︷︸
(1)>0
+ vq dp︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)>0
+ (t+ vp)dq︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)<0
,
where term (1) expresses (direct) gain, multiplied by the output q, and term (2) shows (indirect)
gain, due to the associated price increase, multiplied by vq, whereas term (3) is the part that
exhibits (indirect) loss from the output reduction for both unit tax revenue and ad valorem tax
revenue. Now recall that dp = ρtdt and pηdq = −qdp. Thus, qdt = qdp/ρt = −(pη/ρt)dq and
vqdp = −(vqp/q)ηdq = −(vpη)dq, which implies that
dR = −(pη/ρ)dq − (vpη)dq + (t+ vp)dq = [(−pη/ρt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)>0
+ (−vpη)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)>0
+ (t+ vp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)<0
].
37The welfare change dW = (p−mc)dq is further decomposed into:
dW = −qdp+ {pdq + qdp− [qdt+ vqdp+ (t+ vp)dq]−mc · dq}+ [qdt+ vpdp+ (t+ vp)dq]
= −qdp︸ ︷︷ ︸
dCS
+ {[(1− v)p− t]dq + [(1− v)dp− dt]q −mc · dq︸ ︷︷ ︸}+
dPS
[qdt+ vpdp+ (t+ vp)dq︸ ︷︷ ︸],
dR
where dPS can be further simplified (see below).
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Now, in the per-price term, the denominator and the numerator in MCt are expressed as follows:
MCt =
(1− v)ηθ + τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare loss expressed by the profit margin(
1
ρt
+ v
)
η︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue gain
+ (−τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue loss
.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The impact of a change dt in the tax t on consumer surplus (per firm) is dCS = −qdp = −qρtdt.
The impact on producer surplus is
dPS = d[(1− v) pq − c (q)− tq] = −q dt+ (1− v) p dq + (1− v) qdp−mcdq − t dq,
⇔ dPS = −qdt+ (1− v) qρtdt+ [(1− v) p−mc− t]dq.
Substituting for mc from Equation (1) as mc = (1− v) (1− ηθ) p− t gives
dPS = −qdt+ (1− v) qρtdt+ (1− v) ηθpdq = −qdt+ (1− v) qρtdt− (1− v) θqdp,
⇔ dPS = −qdt+ (1− v) qρtdt− (1− v) θqρtdt = −[1− (1− v) (1− θ) ρt]q dt.
The reciprocal of the incidence ratio is
1
It
=
dPS
dCS
=
(1− v) (1− θ) qρt − q
−qρt
=
1
ρt
− (1− v) (1− θ) .
For infinitesimal changes in ad valorem taxes, we proceed analogously. The change in consumer
surplus is dCS = −qdp = −qpρvdv. For the change in producer surplus we have
dPS = d ((1− v) pq − c (q)− tq) = −pq dv + (1− v) p dq + (1− v) qdp−mcdq − t dq.
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Manipulating the last four terms on the right-hand side in the same way as before leads to
dPS = −pq dv + (1− v) p dq + (1− v) qdp−mcdq − t dq,
dPS = −pq dv + (1− v) qpρvdv − (1− v) θqpρvdv = [(1− v) (1− θ) ρv − 1] qp dv.
The reciprocal of the incidence ratio then becomes
1
It
=
dPS
dCS
=
(1− v) (1− θ) ρvq − q
−qρv
=
1
ρv
− (1− v) (1− θ) .
A.1.4 Intuition behind Proposition 2
The intuitive reasoning behind Proposition 2 can be provided as follows. First, the effects of an
increase in unit tax, dt, on the producer surplus can be decomposed into the following five parts:
dPS = [(−q dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)<0
+ (1− v)p dq︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)<0
] + [(1− v)q dp︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)>0
+ (−mcdq)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4)>0
+ (−t dq)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5)>0
],
where term (1) shows the (direct) loss from an increase in unit tax: the tax increase multiplied by
the output q, and term (2) is another (indirect) loss from a reduction in production, multiplied by
the ad valor em tax adjusted unit price (1−v)p, whereas term (3) corresponds to the (direct) gain
from the associated price increase, mitigated by (1− v), due to the ad valorem tax, multiplied by
the output q, and finally terms (4) and (5) are (indirect) gains from cost savings by the output
reduction, dq, and from unit tax saving by the output reduction, dq, respectively. Note here that
the equation above is rewritten as
dPS = [−q dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)<0
+ (1− v)q dp︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)>0
] + [(1− v)p− (mc+ t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
]dq.
43
Now, in symmetric equilibrium, the marginal cost, mc + t, is equal to the marginal benefit,
(1− v)p[1− ηθ], which implies
dPS = [−q dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)<0
+ (1− v)q dp︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)>0
] + [(1− v)p]ηθ dq.
Under perfect competition, part (2) is equal to the sum of parts (4) and (5), and thus only parts
(1) and (3) survive. However, under imperfect competition, the marginal cost is less than (1−v)p,
thus part (2) is greater than the sum of parts (4) and (5). The third term in the equation above
now expresses the difference between part (2) and the sum of parts (4) and (5). Now, recall that
dp = ρtdt and pηdq = −qdp. Thus,
dPS = [−q dt+ (1− v)qρt dt]− (1− v)qθ dp = [−q dt+ (1− v)qρt dt]− (1− v)qθρt dt
= [−1 + (1− v)ρt − (1− v)θρt]q dt = [ −1︸︷︷︸
(1)<0
+ (1− v)(1− θ)ρt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)−{(2)−[(4)+(5)]}≷0
]q dt.
On the other hand, dCS = −ρt(qdt). Thus, while it is always the case that dCS < 0, it is possible
that dPS > 0.38
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us consider a simultaneous infinitesimal change dt and dv in the taxes t and v that leaves the
equilibrium price (and quantity) unchanged, which requires the effective marginal cost (t+mc) / (1− v)
in Equation (1) to remain the same. This implies the comparative statics relationship
∂
∂t
(
t+mc
1− v
)
dt+
∂
∂v
(
t+mc
1− v
)
dv = 0⇒ dt
1− v +
t+mc
(1− v)2 dv = 0⇒ dt = −
t+mc
1− v dv.
Note that here we do not need to take derivatives of mc even though it depends on q, simply
because by assumption the quantity is unchanged. The total induced change in price, which
38One can also define social incidence by SIt≡ dW/dPS and SIv in association with a small change in t and
v, respectively. Hereafter, we focus on MCt and MCv as measures of welfare burden in society, and It and
Iv as measures of loss in consumer welfare. We provide general formulas for social incidence in the context of
multi-dimensional pass-through after Section 4.
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generally would be expressed as dp = ρtdt + ρvp dv, must equal zero in this case, implying the
result
ρtdt+ ρvp dv= 0⇒ −
t+mc
1− v ρtdv + ρvp dv= 0⇒ ρv= (1− ηθ) ρt ⇒ ρv =
− θ

ρt.
A.1.6 Intuition behind Proposition 3
To understand this proposition (3) intuitively, note that to keep prices and quantities constant,
∆t and ∆v must satisfy:
t+∆t+mc
1− (v +∆v) =
t+mc
1− v .
Thus, the relative ∆t that must be offset by a reduction −∆v equal to (t + mc)/(1 − v): ∆t =
−(t+mc)∆v/(1− v), which, together with ρtdt+ ρvp dv = 0, leads to (t+mc)ρt/[(1− v)p] = ρv.
Now, recall the Lerner rule:
1− t+mc
(1− v)p︸ ︷︷ ︸
per-price marginal cost
= ηθ,
which implies that (1 − ηθ)ρt = ρv, as Proposition 3 claims. Now, θ/ = 1 − ρv/ρt implies that
ρv ≤ ρt ≤ (1− 1/) ρv.
A.1.7 Intuition behind Proposition 4
To gain a perspective in Proposition 4, recall from Proposition 1 that
MCt =
(1− v)ηθ + τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare loss expressed by the profit margin(
1
ρt
+ v
)
η︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue gain
+ (−τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue loss
.
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Now, Proposition 4 states that it is also understood as
MCt =
(1− v)
(
1− ρv
ρt
)
+ τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare loss expressed by the profit margin(
1
ρt
+ v
)
η︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue gain
+ (−τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue loss
.
Of course, it is true that θ is expressed by the empirical measures such as θ = (1−ρv/ρt). For
example, in the case of the assumption of Cournot competition, researchers often may observe the
number n of firms and conclude that the value of conduct index is θ = 1/n. However, even in the
case of homogeneous products, the “true” conduct may be higher than 1/n due to such reasons
as collusion.39 Proposition 4 above circumvents this difficulty in estimating MCt and MCv.
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Conversely, one would be able to estimate θ using the proposition above once , ρt, and ρv are
estimated.
A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 5
Here we provide a proof of Proposition 5, as well as related intuitive arguments. Consider the
comparative statics with respect to a small change dt in the per-unit tax t. Following Weyl and
Fabinger (2013, p. 538), we define ms ≡ −p′q: this is the negative of marginal consumer surplus.
Then, the Learner condition becomes:
p− t+mc
1− v︸ ︷︷ ︸
markup
= θms︸︷︷︸
CS
,
39See Miller and Weinberg (2017) for an empirical study of the possibility of oligopolistic collusion in a different
manner from directly estimating the conduct parameter.
40Similarly, the incidence of a unit tax is expressed as
1
It
=
1
ρt
− (1− v)
[
(1− ) + ρv
ρt

]
,
and analogously for the case of an ad valorem tax.
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where CS is consumer surplus for the infra-marginal consumers. Importantly, θms measures how
much consumer surplus rises for a small increase in output, and it is largest under monopoly. Now
consider a small change in unit tax expressed by dt > 0. Then, in equilibrium,
dp− dt+ dmc
1− v = d(θms) ⇔ (1− v)[ dp︸︷︷︸
>0
− d(θms)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in marginal benefit
= dt︸︷︷︸
>0
+ dmc︸︷︷︸
<0︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in effective marginal cost
Thus, using dt = dp/ρt, the equation is rewritten as
ρt =
1
(1− v) [dp+ (−d (θms))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)>0: revenue increase
+ (−dmc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)>0: cost savings
dp.
Now, consider term (1). Note first d(θms) = (θms)′dq so that d(θms) = −q(θms)′dp/p
because by definition dq = −qdp/p. Here, for a small increase dt > 0,
d(θms)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
= −q︸︷︷︸
>0
(θms)′
dp
p︸︷︷︸
>0
so that (θms)′ > 0. By definition, ms ≡ −p′q = ηp. Thus, d(θms) = −q(θηp)′dp/p. Now note
that (θηp)′ = (θη)′p+ (θη)p′. Thus,
d(θms) = −q [(θη)′p+ (θη)p′] dp
p
⇔ d(θms) = −q(θη)′dp+ (−q(θη)p′dp/p) = [θη − q(θη)′]dp > 0.
Next, consider term (2). A change in the marginal cost, dmc, is expressed in terms of dp
by dmc = −[(1− v) θη + 1 − τ ]χ dp < 0. To see this, note first that dmc =χmc · (dq/q)=
−(χmc) (dp/p). Then, mc in this expression can be eliminated rewriting p−θms = (mc+ t) / (1− v)⇒
mc = (1− v) (p+ θqp′) − t = (1− v) (1− θη) p − t, which leads to dmc = −[(1− v) (1 + θη) −
t/p]χ dp. Then, in terms of the per-unit revenue burden, τ ≡ v+t/p, that is, dmc = −[(1− v) (1− θη)−
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τ + v]χ dp = −[− (1− v) θη + 1− τ ]χ dp. Finally, using the expressions for dmc and d(θms),
ρt =
dp
(1− v) [dp− d (θms)]− dmc =
1
(1− v) [(1− θη) + (θη)′ q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue increase
+ (1− τ) χ− (1− v) θχ︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost savings
.
⇔ ρt =
1
1− v
1
[(1− θη) + (θη)′ q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue increase
+
[
−θ + 1− τ
1− v 
]
χ︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost savings
.
A.1.9 Relationship to Weyl and Fabinger (2013)
It can be verified that our formula for ρt above is a generalization of Weyl and Fabinger’s (2013,
p. 548) Equation (2):
ρ =
1
1 + D−θ
S
+ θ
θ
+ θ
ms
,
where θ ≡ θ/[q · (θ)′], ms ≡ ms/[ms′q] (ms ≡ −p′q is defined in the proof of Proposition 5 just
above), and D and S here are our  and 1/χ, respectively. First, the denominator in our formula
is rewritten as:
1− (η + χ) θ + q (θη)′ + 1− τ
1− v χ = 1 +
1−τ
1−v D − θ
S
+
θ
θ
+ θ ·
(
− 1
D
+ η′Dq
)
because
(θη)′q = (θ′η + θη′)q =
[
θ
qθ
η + θη′
]
q =
θ
θ
+ θη′q.
Next, since η = −qp′/p, it is verified that η′ = −{p′p+ qpp′′ − q[p′]2}/p2, implying that
η′Dq =
p′p+ qpp′′ − q[p′]2
p2
· p
p′q
· q = 1
D
+
(
1 +
p′′
p′
q
)
,
where 1 + p′′q/p is replaced by 1/ms because ms ≡ −p′q and thus ms′ = −(p′′q + p′). Then, it is
readily verified that
1− (η + χ) θ + q (θη)′ + 1− τ
1− v χ = 1 +
1−τ
1−v D − θ
S
+
θ
θ
+
θ
ms
.
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In summary, Weyl and Fabinger’s (2013, p. 548) original Equation (2) is generalized to
ρ =
1
1− v
1
1 +
1−τ
1−v D−θ
S
+ θ
θ
+ θ
ms
with non-zero initial ad valorem tax, which is equivalent to our formula for ρt:
ρt =
1
1− v
1
1 + 1−τ
1−v χ− (η + χ) θ + q (θη)′
.
A.1.10 Comparison of perfect and oligopolistic competition
One can further interpret the formula for ρt in comparison to the case of perfect competition (with
zero initial taxes), when the unit tax pass-through rate is given by (see Weyl and Fabinger 2013,
p. 534): ρt = 1/(1 + χ). An analogous argument can be made for ρv as well.
First, through the term − (η + χ) θ in the denominator of ρt in Proposition 5, as competitive-
ness becomes fiercer (i.e., a lower θ) the pass-through rate ρt lowers, that is, the pass-through
becomes smaller as the degree of competition becomes closer to perfect competition. This is
interpreted as the negative effect of competitiveness on the pass-through rate, via the first-order
characteristics of demand and supply, captured by η and χ, respectively.41
However, through the other term q (θη)′ = −q (−θη)′, competitiveness raises the pass-
through rate ρt. To see this, suppose that η is close to a constant. Then, −q (−θη)′ = −q (−θ)′,
which implies that a larger (−θ)′ ≡ −∂θ/∂q > 0 is associated with a higher value of the pass-
through rate. With an abuse of notation, this situation is interpreted as the case when −∂q/∂θ is
small: the effect of imperfect competition on the output reduction is small, implying less distor-
tion, an important feature if the degree of competition is close to perfect competition.
The argument so far is clearer if θ, as often assumed, is a constant. Then, the second term is
41Here, with fixed θ, the denominator becomes smaller, and thus, the pass-through rate becomes larger as the
demand becomes inelastic (i.e., η becomes larger, although η cannot be too large; recall the restriction, η < 1/θ)
or the supply becomes inelastic (i.e., χ becomes larger).
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now −q (−θη)′ = −qθ (−η)′ = θ(η + 1/ms) so that
ρt =
1
1− v
1[
1 + 1−τ
1−v χ
]
+
(
1
ms
− χ
)
θ
.
Thus, if the marginal cost is constant (χ = 0), ρt becomes larger as the degree of competition
becomes closer to perfect competition. Here, with fixed θ, the pass-through rate is also larger as
1/ms becomes smaller. Recall that 1/ms = (∆ms/ms)/(∆q/q) measures how quick the marginal
surplus lowers as a response to a decrease in output q. Thus, a lower 1/ms is associated with less
distortion. Overall, Weyl and Fabinger’s (2013, p. 548) Equation (2) and our formula for ρt show
how it is influenced by the industry’s competitiveness which is captured by the conduct index.
A.1.11 Application to exchange rate changes
Let us also point out that the exchange rate pass-through can be included naturally in our
framework of Section 2.42 Suppose that domestic firms in a country of interest use some im-
ported inputs for production. For concreteness, let us specify the profit function of firm j as
pij = [(1 − v)pj − t]qj − (1 + a e)c(qj), where the constant coefficient a measures the importance
imported inputs and e > 0 is the exchange rate. Notice that the firm’s profit is rewritten as
pij = (1 + ae)
[(
1−v
1+ae
pj − t
1+ae
)
qj − c(qj)
]
. Since the first factor on the right-hand side is con-
stant, the firm will behave as if its profit function was simply p˜ij =
[
(1− v˜)pj − t˜
]
qj − c(qj), with
v˜ ≡ (v + ae)/(1 + ae) and t˜ ≡ t/(1 + ae). By utilizing the explicit expressions for the derivatives
∂v˜/∂e = (a − v)/(1 + ae)2 and ∂t˜/∂e = −at/(1 + ae)2, one can analyze the effect of a change in
the exchange rate e on social welfare. Note that this is simply interpreted as the cost pass-through
as well (see the references in Footnote 42 for empirical studies). Alternatively, one may use the
results of Section 6 to study the consequences of exchange rate movements.
42See, e.g., Feenstra (1989); Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1996); Yang (1997); Campa and Goldberg (2005);
Hellerstein (2008); Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010); Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013); Auer and Schoenle
(2016); and Chen and Juvenal (2016) for empirical studies of exchange rate pass-through.
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A.1.12 Oligopoly with multi-product firms
Here, we argue that the results obtained in Sections 2 and 3 can be extended to the case of
multi-product firms just by a reinterpretation of the same formulas (without modifying them).43
Assume there are np product categories, and the demand for firm j’s k-th product is given by
qjk = qjk(p1,p2, ..,pn), where pj = (pj1, ..., pjk, ..., pjK) for each j = 1, 2, ..., n.
44 The firms are
symmetric, and for each firm, the product it produces are also symmetric. The firm’s profit per
product is
pij =
1
np
np∑
k=1
((1− v) pjkqjk − tqjk − c(qjk)) .
We work with an equilibrium in which any firm j sets a uniform price pj for all of its products:
pjk = pj, and consequently sells an amount qj of each of them: qjk = qj.
45 In this case, the profit
per product equals pij = (1− v) pjqj− tqj− c(qj), which is formally the same as for single-product
firms. For this reason, we can identify the prices pj and quantities qj of Section 2 with the prices
pj and quantities qj introduced here in this paragraph. The discussion in Section 2 was general
and applies to this case of symmetric oligopoly with multi-product firms as well. We can use the
same definitions for the variables of interest, including the industry demand elasticity  and the
conduct index θ.
The definitions and results for the cases of price competition and quantity competition dis-
cussed Section 3 are also applicable here. It may be useful to translate some of the most important
variables of that discussion into product-level variables. For derivatives of the direct demand sys-
43Lapan and Hennessy (2011) study unit and ad valorem taxes in multi-product Cournot oligopoly. Alexan-
drov and Bedre-Defolie (2017) also study cost pass-through of multi-product firms in relation to the Le Chate-
lier–Samuelson principle.
44See, e.g., Armstrong and Vickers (2018) and Nocke and Schutz (2018) for recent studies of multi-product
oligopoly.
45For brevity, we do not explicitly discuss the standard conditions for the existence and uniqueness of non-
cooperative Nash equilibria of the different underlying oligopoly games.
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tem, we introduce the notation:46
ξ1 ≡ ∂qjk∂pjk , ξ0,1 ≡
∂qjk
∂pjk′
,
ξ2 ≡ ∂qjk∂p2jk , ξ1,1 ≡
∂qjk
∂pjk∂pjk′
, ξ0,2 ≡ ∂qjk∂p2
jk′
, ξ0,1,1 ≡ ∂qjk∂pjk′∂pjk′′ ,
ξ˜2 ≡ ∂qjk∂pjk∂pj′k ξ˜1,1 ≡
∂qjk
∂pjk∂pj′k′
, ξ˜0,2 ≡ ∂qjk∂pjk′∂pj′k′ , ξ˜0,1,1 ≡
∂qjk
∂pjk′∂pj′k′′
,
where the derivatives are evaluated at the fully symmetric point, where any pjk equals the common
value p. For specific choices of the demand system, these derivatives can be closely related. For
example, if the substitution pattern between two goods produced by two different firms does not
depend on the identity of the goods, then ξ˜2 = ξ˜0,2 = ξ˜1,1 = ξ˜0,1,1. In terms of these derivatives,
we can write
F = −pq
(
ξ1 + (np − 1) ξ0,1
)
,
 = −p
q
(
ξ1 + (np − 1) ξ0,1 + (n− 1) ξ˜1 + (n− 1) (np − 1) ξ˜0,1
)
,
αF =
p2
q F
(
ξ2 + (np − 1)
(
ξ1,1 + ξ0,2 + (np − 2) ξ0,1,1
))
,
αC = (n− 1) p2q F
(
ξ˜2 + (np − 1) (ξ˜1,1 + ξ˜0,2 + (np − 2) ξ˜0,1,1)
)
.
These can be substituted into the results of Proposition 6 to find the pass-through and the marginal
cost of public funds under price competition.
For the inverse demand system the analogous definitions are
ζ1 ≡ ∂qjk∂pjk , ζ0,1 ≡
∂qjk
∂pjk′
,
ζ2 ≡ ∂qjk∂p2jk , ζ1,1 ≡
∂qjk
∂pjk∂pjk′
, ζ0,2 ≡ ∂qjk∂p2
jk′
, ζ0,1,1 ≡ ∂qjk∂pjk′∂pjk′′ ,
ζ˜2 ≡ ∂qjk∂pjk∂pj′k ζ˜1,1 ≡
∂qjk
∂pjk∂pj′k′
, ζ˜0,2 ≡ ∂qjk∂pjk′∂pj′k′ , ζ˜0,1,1 ≡
∂qjk
∂pjk′∂pj′k′′
.
46In this notation, the first subscript counts the derivatives with respect to the relevant price with index k,
the second subscript counts the derivatives with respect to the price with index k′ distinct from k, and the third
subscript counts derivatives respect to the price with index k′′ distinct from both k and k′. Further, ξ corresponds
to derivatives with respect to prices charged by the same firm j, while ξ˜ corresponds to derivatives with respect to
prices charged by firm j and some other firm j′.
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The relations
ηF = − qp
(
ζ1 + (np − 1) ζ0,1
)
,
η = − q
p
(
ζ1 + (np − 1) ζ0,1 + (n− 1) ζ˜1 + (n− 1) (np − 1) ζ˜0,1
)
,
σF =
q2
p ηF
(
ζ2 + (np − 1)
(
ζ1,1 + ζ0,2 + (np − 2) ζ0,1,1
))
,
σC = (n− 1) q2p ηF
(
ζ˜2 + (np − 1) (ζ˜1,1 + ζ˜0,2 + (np − 2) ζ˜0,1,1)
)
.
can be substituted into the results of Proposition 7 to find the pass-through and marginal cost of
public funds under price competition.
A.2 Proofs and discussions for Section 3
A.2.1 Relationship between elasticities and curvatures under the direct demand
system
This relationship can be verified as follows. The elasticity of the function F (p) equals the sum of
the elasticities of the three factors it is composed of:
1
F (p)
p
d
dp
F (p) =
1
p
p
d
dp
p+ q (p) p
d
dp
1
q (p)
+
(
∂qj(p)
∂pj
)−1
|p=(p,...,p)p d
dp
(
∂qj(p)
∂pj
|p=(p,...,p)
)
.
The first elasticity on the right-hand side equals 1, the second elasticity equals  (p), and the third
elasticity equals −αF (p)− αC(p), since
p
d
dp
∂qj(p)
∂pj
|p=(p,...,p) = p∂
2qj(p)
∂p2j
|p=(p,...,p) + (n− 1) p∂
2qj(p)
∂pj∂pj′
|p=(p,...,p).
Note that α is weakly positive (weakly negative) if the industry demand is convex (concave),
and αF is weakly positive (weakly negative) if the demand as a function of firm j’s own price is
convex (concave). Hence, both α and αF measure the degree of convexity in the demand function
for an industry-wide price change and for an individual firm’s price change, respectively. Note also
that ∂(∂qj/∂pj)/∂pj′ in αC measures the effects of firm j’s price change on how many consumers
rival j′ loses if it raises its price. If this is negative (positive), then firm j′ loses more (less)
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consumers by its own price increase for a higher value of pj. Thus, because ∂qj/∂pj′ is positive in
the expression for αC , a higher αC also indicates more competitiveness in the industry. It is also
expected that the industry is more competitive if α and αF are higher. In effect, the equilibrium
price is characterized by F . However, a policy change around equilibrium is also affected by
the curvatures, which measure “second-order competitiveness” around the equilibrium. However,
Proposition 6 in the text shows that α is the only curvature that determines the pass-through
rates.
A.2.2 Relationship between elasticities and curvatures under the inverse demand
system
In analogy with Appendix A.2.1, the elasticity of the function ηF (q) is the sum of the elasticities
of the three factors it is composed of, which are equal to 1, η (q), and −σF (q)− σC (q).
Now, σ is weakly positive (weakly negative) if the industry’s inverse demand is convex (con-
cave), and σF is weakly positive (weakly negative) if the inverse demand as a function of firm j’s
own output is convex (concave). Here, concavity, not convexity, is related to a sharp reduction
in price in response to an increase in firm j’s output. Thus, −σ and −σF measure “second-order
competitiveness” of the industry, which characterizes the responsiveness of the equilibrium output
when a policy is changed. Note also that ∂(∂pj/∂qj)/∂qj′ in σC measures the effects of firm j’s
output increase on the extent of rival (j′)’s price drop if it increases its output. If this is negative
(positive), then firm j′ expects a large (little) drop in its price by increasing its output for a higher
value of qj. Because ∂pj/∂qj′ is negative in the expression for σC , a lower σC or a higher −σC
indicates more competitiveness in the industry. In sum, while 1/ηF characterizes competitiveness
that determines the level of the equilibrium quantity, −σ, −σF , and −σC determine competitive-
ness that characterizes the responsiveness of the equilibrium output by a policy change. However,
similarly to the case of price competition, Proposition 7 in the text shows that σ is the only
curvature that determines the pass-through rates.
54
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 6
Since in the case of price setting θ = /F = 1/(ηF ), we have (η + χ) θ = (1 + χ) /F and
(θη)′ q = q d
dq
(θη) = q d
dq
(−1F ) = −−2F q ddq F = −2F p ddpF = (1 + − α/F ) /F , where in the
last equality we utilize the expression for the elasticity of F (p) and αF + αC = α/F from
Subsection 3.1. Substituting these into the expression for ρt in Proposition 5 gives
ρt =
1
1− v
1
1− 1
F
(1 + χ) + 1
F
(
1 + − α
F
)
+ 1−τ
1−v χ
,
which is equivalent to the expression for ρt in the proposition. Since for price setting θ = /F , the
relationship in Proposition 3 implies ρv = (− θ) ρt/ = (F − 1)ρt/F , which leads to the desired
expression for ρv.
A.2.4 Intuition behind Proposition 6
The intuition for ρt in Proposition 6 is as follows. First, recall from Proposition 5 that
ρt =
1
1− v
1
[(1−θη)+(θη)′ q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue increase
+
[
1− τ
1− v − θ
]
χ︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost savings
.
Then, with θ = /F , 1 − θη = 1 − 1/F , (θη)′ q = (1 + − α/F ) /F , the equality above is
rewritten as
ρt =
1
1− v
1[(
1− 1
F
)
+
1 + − α/F
F
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue increase
+
[
1− τ
1− v −
1
F
]
χ︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost savings
=
1
1− v
1[
1 +
(1− α/F )
F
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue increase
+
[
1− τ
1− v −
1
F
]
χ︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost savings
.
To further facilitate the understanding the connection of this result for to Proposition 5,
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consider the case of zero initial taxes (t = v = τ = 0). Then, Proposition 5 claims that
ρt =
1
1 + χ− θχ+ [−ηθ + q (θη)′] ,
whereas Proposition 6 shows that
ρt =
1
1 + χ− θχ+ [−1

· 
F
+ 1+(1−α/F )
F
]
=
1
1 + χ− θχ+
(
1− α
F
)
θ
,
because θ = /F . Here, the direct effect from −ηθ is canceled out by the part of the indirect effect
from q (θη)′. The new term, which appears as the fourth term in the denominator, shows how
the industry’s curvature affects the pass-through rate: as the demand curvature becomes larger
(i.e., as the industry’s demand becomes more convex), then the pass-through rate becomes higher,
although this effect is mitigated by the degree of competitiveness, θ.
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 7
In the case of quantity setting, θ = ηF/η, so (η + χ) θ = (1 + χ/η) ηF and (θη)
′ q = q (ηF )
′/η =
(1 + η − ση/ηF ) ηF/η, where in the last equality we utilize the expression for the elasticity of
ηF (q) and σF + σC = ση/ηF from Subsection 3.1. Substituting these into the expression for ρt in
Proposition 5 gives
ρt =
1
1− v
1
1− (1 + 1
η
χ)ηF +
1
η
(
1 + η − ση
ηF
)
ηF +
1−τ
1−v
1
η
χ
,
which is equivalent to the expression for ρt in the proposition. Since θ = ηF/η, Proposition
3 implies ρv = (− θ) ρt/ = (1/η − ηF/η) ρtη = (1− ηF ) ρt, which can be used to verify the
expression for ρv.
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A.2.6 Intuition behind Proposition 7
The intuition for ρt in Proposition 6 is similar to the case of price competition. Recall again that
ρt =
1
1− v
1
[(1−θη)+(θη)′ q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue increase
+
[
1− τ
1− v − θ
]
χ︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost savings
.
Then, θ = ηF/η implies (1/S − η) θ = [(1/Sη) − 1]ηF and (θη)′ (q/η) = q (ηF )′/η
= (1 + η − σF − σC) (ηF/η). Thus, the equality above is rewritten as
ρt =
1
1− v
1[
(1− ηF ) + 1 + η − ση/ηF
η
ηF
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue increase
+
[
1− τ
1− v
1
Sη
− ηF
Sη
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost savings
=
1
1− v
1[
1 +
ηF − ση
η
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue increase
+
[
1− τ
1− v − ηF
]
1
Sη︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost savings
.
To further facilitate the understanding the connection of this result for to Proposition 5,
consider the case of zero initial taxes (t = v = τ = 0) again. Then, Proposition 7 shows that
ρt =
1
1 + χ− θχ+ [−η · ηF
η
+
(
1 + 1
η
− σ
ηF
)
ηF ]
=
1
1 + χ− θχ+ (1− σ
θ
)
θ
because θ = ηF/η. Here, the term (1− σ/θ) θ demonstrates the effects of the industry’s inverse
demand curvature, σ, on the pass-through rate: as the inverse demand curvature becomes larger
(i.e., as the industry’s inverse demand becomes more convex), the pass-through rate becomes
higher. Interestingly, in contrast to the case of price competition, this effect is not mitigated by
the degree of competitiveness, θ.
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A.2.7 Equilibrium prices and outputs under price and quantity competition with
the linear demand
The equilibrium price and output under price competition are obtained as
p =
1 + t
1−v
2− (n− 1)µ, q =
1− [1− (n− 1)µ] t
1−v
2− (n− 1)µ ,
and thus
p
q
=
1
1− [1− (n− 1)µ] t
1−v
(
1 +
t
1− v
)
,
implying that
 =
[1− (n− 1)µ] (1 + t
1−v
)
1− [1− (n− 1)µ] t
1−v
, F =
1 + t
1−v
1− [1− (n− 1)µ] t
1−v
.
Similarly, the equilibrium price and output under quantity competition are given by
p =
1−(n−2)µ
1−(n−1)µ + (1 + µ)
t
1−v
2− (n− 3)µ , q = (1 + µ)
1− [1− (n− 1)µ] t
1−v
2− (n− 3)µ ,
and thus
p
q
=
1
1− [1− (n− 1)µ] t
1−v
(
1− (n− 2)µ
(1 + µ)[1− (n− 1)µ] +
t
1− v
)
,
implying that
η =
1− [1− (n− 1)µ] t
1−v
1−(n−2)µ
1+µ
+ [1− (n− 1)µ] t
1−v
, ηF =
1− [1− (n− 1)µ] t
1−v
1 + (1+µ)[1−(n−1)µ]
1−(n−2)µ
t
1−v
.
A.3 Proofs and discussions for Section 4
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 8
Consider an infinitesimal tax change such that the equilibrium price (and therefore quantity) does
not change: ρ˜ · dT = 0. Let us choose dT to have just two non-zero components: dT` and dT`′ .
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This implies
ρ˜T`
ρ˜T`′
= −dT`′
dT`
. (7)
Since Equation (3) must hold both before and after the tax change, it must be the case that
1− τ − (1− ν) ηθ does not change, and in turn
(−τT` + νT`ηθ) dT` +
(−τT`′ + νT`′ηθ) dT`′ = 0.
Substituting for dT`′ from this equation into Equation (7) and using the definition of pass-through
quasi-elasticities leads to the desired result.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 9
The same type of reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 5 is useful in proving Proposition 9. In
particular, comparative statics of Equation (3) with respect to a tax T` leads to the desired result
after utilizing the definitions above and eliminating marginal cost using, again, Equation (3). The
calculation is a bit tedious but completely straightforward.
A.3.3 Depreciating licenses
Here we discuss the relationship of exogenous competition to depreciating licenses in Weyl and
Zhang (2017). In the setup of Section 2 of Weyl and Zhang (2017), there are two agents, S and B
(“seller” and “buyer”). Agent S holds an asset and declares a reservation value p, which influences
the tax (“license fee”) q˜p the agent needs to pay to the government. Here q˜ is the license tax
rate (denoted τ in the original paper). Agent B may then purchase the asset at that price p from
agent S. The value for agent S is η + γS, and for agent B it is η + γB, for some common value
component η.47 Here γB is a random variable with CDF F (γB) representing heterogeneity in
B’s value, which is not observed by S. As Weyl and Zhang (2017) show, the sale probability q
(denoted the same way in the original paper) is then determined as the solution of P (q) = p, where
P (q) ≡ F−1(1− q) + η. Up to a constant, agent S’s expected profit function (utility function) is
47The original paper considers η being determined by agent S at the very beginning. Here we focus on the
subgame after η has been determined.
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(P (q)− η − γS)(q − q˜) or P (q) (q − q˜)− (q − q˜)mc, where we used the notation mc ≡ η + γS.48
We recognize that this is exactly of the same form as the profit function in the case of monopoly
with constant marginal cost mc subject to exogenous competition q˜ and inverse demand function
P (q).
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